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CONTRACT GOVERNANCE IN SMALL-WORLD 
NETWORKS: THE CASE OF THE  
MAGHRIBI TRADERS 
Lisa Bernstein 
ABSTRACT—This Article revisits the best known example of successful 
private ordering in the economics literature: the Maghribi Jewish merchants 
who engaged in both local and long-distance trade across the Islamic 
Mediterranean in the eleventh century. Drawing on a case study of over 200 
Maghribi merchant letters, it develops a network governance-based account 
of the way that private ordering might have supported exchange among the 
Maghribi traders with little or no reliance on the public legal system. The 
analysis reveals that a particular type of bridge-and-cluster configuration of 
ties among traders and trading centers--known as a “small-world network”—
can have strong reputation-based contract enforcement properties that make 
it possible support trade over long distances, even in environments of noisy 
information. This structure economizes on information costs by aggregating 
information in local nodes and then connecting these nodes with ties that are 
robust enough to transmit the relevant information but sparse enough to do 
so at a cost far below the cost of keeping all transactors in the market aware 
of all reputation-relevant information all of the time. Identifying the 
governance power of small-world networks reveals that the small, 
geographically concentrated, close-knit groups (known as cliques) that the 
legal literature has long associated with successful private ordering are not 
in fact a precondition for well-functioning private order—small-world 
networks can effectively support trade among large numbers of traders 
operating at considerable distances from one another. In addition, because 
the small world network form can be found in many industries today, 
recognizing its potential contract governance properties should make it 
possible to better understand the ways trade both is and can be supported in 
a variety of modern markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Avner Greif’s study of the contract enforcement institution used by the 
Maghribi Jewish merchants in the Muslim world in the late Middle Ages is 
a seminal work in the literature on private ordering.1 Drawing on merchant 
letters and other documents from the Cairo Geniza, he describes a private 
order institution,2 the traders’ coalition,3 that might have enabled the 
Maghribi to trade with one another over long distances across the Islamic 
Mediterranean4 by employing fellow Maghribi as agents, whom they could 
trust not to cheat.5 The traders’ coalition was “a nonanonymous 
 
 1 Greif’s three seminal papers on the Maghribi traders have been widely cited. See Avner Greif, 
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition, 
83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993) [hereinafter Greif, Early Trade] (Google Scholar citations, 2806); Avner 
Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. 
HIST. 857 (1989) [hereinafter Greif, Reputations and Coalitions] (Google Scholar citations, 1530); Avner 
Greif, Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on 
Collectivist and Individualist Societies, 102 J. POL. ECON 912 (1994) [hereinafter Greif, Theoretical 
Reflection] (Google Scholar citations, 2699). Even his harshest critics acknowledge that his work is highly 
influential and plays a central role in debates over how to facilitate economic development and the role 
private institutions can play in supporting exchange. See Jeremy Edwards & Sheilagh Ogilvie, Contract 
Enforcement, Institutions, and Social Capital: The Maghribi Traders Reappraised, 65 ECON. HIST. REV. 
421, 422 (2012) (noting that Greif’s explanation of the Maghribi trade “has come to dominate the social 
science literature,” and that it “is widely used to draw lessons for modern economies,” and “plays an 
influential role in theories of economic and institutional development”); Jessica Goldberg, Choosing and 
Enforcing Business Relationships in the Eleventh-Century Mediterranean: Reassessing the ‘Maghribi 
Traders,’ 216 PAST & PRESENT 3, 7, 9 (2012) [hereinafter Goldberg, Business Relationships] (suggesting 
that it is “important to establish precisely how Geniza merchants used private and public mechanisms, 
since [in light of Greif’s work] this question has become fundamental to widely held views about 
historical and modern economic development” and “a cornerstone for arguments about the role of both 
institutions and cultural beliefs in economic development.”); see also THE WORLD BANK, WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 3–8 (2002), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/850161468336075630/World-development-report-2002-
building-institutions-for-markets [https://perma.cc/YR2B-URU5] (looking to the Maghribi traders as a 
paradigmatic example of successful private ordering). 
 2 See Avner Greif, The Fundamental Problem of Exchange: A Research Agenda in Historical 
Institutional Analysis, 4 EUROPEAN REV. ECON. HIST. 251, 257 (2000) [hereinafter Greif, Agenda] 
(defining an “institution” as “a system of social factors – such as rules, beliefs, norms, and organisations 
– that guide, enable, and constrain the actions of individuals”). 
 3 See Greif, Early Trade, supra note 1, at 531–35 (providing a formal model of the traders’ coalition); 
see also AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM 
MEDIEVAL TRADE 58–90 (2006) [hereinafter GREIF, PATH] (providing a less formal description of the 
coalition theory that sets out the intuitions behind the model). 
 4 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that in addition to Egypt, the Islamic 
Mediterranean “included much of Iberia, all of North Africa, and parts of Sicily and the Levant”). 
 5 Greif emphasizes that the trust observed among the Maghribi was not the product of “social control 
systems or ethics.” See Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 859. Rather, it was the observed 
equilibrium outcome of the operation of the traders’ coalition under the conditions assumed in his model. 
Id. However, his explanation of the origins and operation of the traders’ coalition is based on his view 
that “the Maghribis’ social identity provided the means to coordinate expectations required for the 
functioning of the coalition,” Greif, Early Trade, supra note 1, at 539, and relies on his observation that 
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organizational framework through which agency relations [were] established 
only among [those] with a specific identity.”6 Interactions among the traders 
were governed by an “implicit contract” that had its roots in the Maghribis’ 
collectivist culture.7 The implicit contract required “each coalition merchant 
[to] employ only member agents and [to] pay them the optimal [wage] 
premium.”8 It also involved a commitment by “all coalition merchants . . . 
never to employ an agent who cheated while operating for a coalition 
member,” as well as an understanding that “if an agent who was caught 
cheating operates as a merchant, coalition agents who cheated in their 
dealing with him will not be considered . . . to have cheated.”9 As Greif 
explains, under these conditions, cooperation should, and did, emerge as a 
stable equilibrium, making it possible for trade to flourish among the 
Maghribi with weak, if any, meaningful support from either Jewish or 
Muslim courts. 
Since Greif wrote, historians have attacked the coalition theory as being 
inconsistent with aspects of the historical record.10 Most importantly, they 
 
the Maghribi were a “collectivist” society in which “cultural factors made collective punishment a focal 
point.” Greif, Agenda, supra note 2, at 273; see also Greif, Theoretical Reflection, supra note 1 
(discussing the Maghribis’ collectivist culture). 
 6 Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 868. 
 7 See generally Greif, Theoretical Reflection, supra note 1 (discussing the Maghribis’ collectivist 
culture). 
 8 Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 868. It is unclear from Greif’s analysis how this 
wage premium was paid in a system where the dominant form of exchange, the suhba, was one in which 
the traders exchanged services of equal value that could nevertheless be quite different in kind. See infra 
text accompanying notes 24–26. Greif posits that the wage premium might have been “paid” through the 
“quality of services and outcomes,” the principal performed in exchange for his agent’s services or by his 
overperforming. Email from Avner Greif, Professor of Econ., Stanford Univ., to author (Apr. 21, 2018) 
(on file with Northwestern University Law Review). However, this would have increased what his suhba 
partner was obligated to do in return, making this condition difficult to meet in practice. Moreover, in a 
context where reputation is used to bond trade and it is difficult to determine ex post whether undesirable 
outcomes result from bad luck or willful malfeasance or negligence, overperformance will often be a 
rational strategy, independent of any desire to provide a wage premium. See infra notes 160–164 and 
accompanying text. Finally, since agents could be hired for a wage, it is peculiar that this was an 
uncommon arrangement if a wage premium in fact drove the success of the hypothesized coalition. 
 9 Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 868. 
 10 For the work of the historians who have most directly critiqued Greif’s overall theory, see JESSICA 
L. GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN: THE GENIZA 
MERCHANTS AND THEIR BUSINESS WORLD (2012) [hereinafter GOLDBERG, TRADE AND 
INSTITUTIONS]; Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1; and Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1. 
Greif has responded forcefully to the Edwards and Ogilvie critique. He maintains (among other things) 
that they: misstated his arguments; used a flawed methodological approach to economic history; presented 
examples that properly understood actually advance his theory; and put forth flawed arguments “based 
on unfamiliarity with the original documents, misrepresentations of the literature, and misapprehension 
of the historical context and methodology.” See Avner Greif, The Maghribi Traders: A Reappraisal? 6 
(Mar. 2012), https://web.stanford.edu/~avner/Greif_Papers/2012_Greif_long_ssrn_Maghribi.pdf 
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point out that “there is no evidence to suggest that the Geniza merchant 
community ever excluded a full-fledged merchant, or had the power to do 
so”;11 the letters do not reflect the transmission of the type of information 
needed for a system of reputation-based trade to function; and the Maghribis’ 
use of standard legal forms and observance of so many legal formalities 
suggests that they wanted to at least preserve the option of resorting to legal 
enforcement of contracts (which they sometimes did). These and other 
considerations lead them to conclude that a traders’ coalition did not exist 
and that although “threats to reputation were occasionally used by Geniza 
merchants to help prevent cheating,”12 reputation-based governance was not 
the dominant way of organizing exchange. Rather, it was “only . . . a very 
minor plank laid on top of an important framework of market and legal 
institutions.”13 According to this view, the “Maghribis provide no support for 
the idea that the ‘social capital’ of exclusive, private-order networks can 
substitute for legal mechanisms to support economic development.”14 
Drawing on the approximately 200 Maghribi letters available in 
English15 and the work of leading scholars of the Geniza,16 this Article 
develops a network governance-based account of the way that private 
ordering might have supported exchange among the Maghribi traders with 
 
[https://perma.cc/2SPF-CBRQ] [hereinafter Greif, A Reappraisal?]. For a shorter version of the piece, 
see Avner Greif, The Maghribi Traders: A Reappraisal?, 65 ECON. HIST. REV. 445 (2012). 
 11 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note10, at 150; see also Edwards & Ogilvie, supra 
note 1, at 421 (“Not a single empirical example adduced as evidence of the putative coalition shows that 
a coalition actually existed.”). Greif responded to this critique empirically. He argued that “[t]he Maghribi 
traders’ letters directly support the [coalition] hypothesis by indicating that the Maghribis practiced 
MPS,” that is, a multilateral punishment strategy, and proffered several letters to demonstrate the 
operation and strength of the traders’ coalition. Greif, Early Trade, supra note 1, at 535. But see infra 
note 180 (discussing the key letters Greif invokes to support this claim). He also points out that a complete 
boycott would not have been necessary for the traders’ coalition to have supported trade. Email from 
Avner Greif, Professor of Econ., Stanford Univ., to author (Oct. 4, 2016) (on file with Northwestern 
University Law Review). 
 12 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 32. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 442. 
 15 These letters can be found in S. D. GOITEIN, LETTERS OF MEDIEVAL JEWISH TRADERS (1973) 
[hereinafter GOITEIN, LETTERS]; 1 SHLOMO SIMONSOHN, THE JEWS IN SICILY (1997); ABRAHAM L. 
UDOVITCH, FURTHER LETTERS FROM THE ELEVENTH CENTURY CORRESPONDENCE OF NAHRAY 
BEN NISSIM: MERCHANT, BANKER AND SCHOLAR (1992) [hereinafter UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS]; 
and Norman Arthur Stillman, East-West Relations in the Islamic Mediterranean in the Early 
Eleventh Century: A Study in the Geniza Correspondence of the House of Ibn ‘Awkal (1970) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Northwestern University Law 
Review) [hereinafter Stillman, Dissertation]. 
 16 The Geniza scholars relied on are S.D. Goitein, Avrom L. Udovitch, Philip Ackerman-Lieberman, 
Moshe Gil, Norman Stillman, and Marina Rustow. 
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little or no reliance on the public legal system.17 It shows how given the 
small-world pattern of ties characteristic of the Maghribi network—dense 
connections among the traders in each trading center and sparser connections 
across trading centers that nevertheless linked traders through a small 
number of steps—information could have circulated widely enough to make 
multilateral reputation-based private ordering an effective way of bonding 
exchange, even in the absence of a formal or informal traders’ coalition with 
obligations of mutual support, limited membership, and the power to 
exclude. The account is sensitive to the concerns raised by the historians, yet 
reveals that the aspects of the Maghribi trade they view as evidence that legal 
enforcement was central to the support of exchange are also consistent with 
the network-based theory of private ordering presented here. 
More broadly, identifying the contract governance properties of small-
world networks, as well as smaller subnetwork structures that can also 
contribute to the support of exchange, opens up new ways of thinking about 
how trade is, or can be, supported in a variety of modern markets, even those 
in countries with well-functioning legal systems. The economic forces that 
give rise to small-world networks are common in exchange settings,18 and 
this configuration of ties has also been shown to facilitate innovation, an 
increasingly important focus of contemporary contracting relationships.19 
These considerations suggest that the legal literature on private ordering 
should move beyond its focus on small, geographically concentrated, close-
knit groups (known as dense clique networks)20 and begin to explore the wide 
 
 17 Greif and his historian critics Edwards, Ogilvie, and Goldberg occasionally allude to the Maghribi 
as a network of traders. However, they use the word “network” as a loose metaphor for the connections 
among traders, and, on occasion, as a way of describing conduits for information transfer. GREIF, PATH, 
supra note 3, at 59, 83 (“[T]he informal social networks for information transmission, which became 
available to the Maghribis in the process of immigrating to Tunisia, enabled them to support agency 
relations based on a multilateral punishment strategy.”); Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, 
at 17 (“Jewish Geniza Merchants . . . were a loose network, and each merchant had to construct his own 
web of ashāb [associates] if he wanted to extend multiple activities across space.”); Edwards & Ogilvie, 
supra note 1, at 442 (arguing that the Maghribi were not a “group,” but rather “formed multiple, 
overlapping networks,” and in this respect were similar to other trading groups at the time). However, 
none of these scholars delve into how the structure of the network—that is, the pattern of connections 
between both traders and trading centers—might help explain aspects of contract governance such as the 
use of multilateral sanctions, which trades or traders would be subject to the strongest governance forces, 
or the type of information one would expect to find in the Geniza letters. 
 18 See infra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the economic conditions under which small-
world networks are likely to arise). 
 19 See infra note 289 and accompanying text. 
 20 For case studies of clique networks, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal 
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, 
Diamonds], and ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991). 
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variety of network structures—across markets or between subsets of firms—
that can be used to support exchange. 
Part I of this Article describes the structure of ties within and across the 
major Maghribi trading centers. It demonstrates that the market as a whole 
took the form of a small-world network21 that created pathways for the flow 
of information that could well have made the fear of multilateral reputational 
harm a powerful contract governance mechanism. Part II explores how the 
small-world structure of the Maghribi network was able to support exchange, 
and the ways that its ability to do so was enhanced by the existence of a few 
prominent information nodes in each market, a variety of common market 
practices, and the structure of ties among some smaller subgroups of traders. 
Part III revisits the debate between Greif and his historian critics over 
whether private or public ordering was likely to have been the primary 
contract governance device relied on by Maghribi merchants. It suggests that 
many aspects of the Maghribi trade that historians view as indicative of 
reliance on legal institutions are equally consistent with the network 
governance-based account of the Maghribi trade. It also suggests that 
exploring the ways that legal formalities can support private ordering is 
important to understanding the implications of the Maghribi traders for using 
private order institutions as a complement to, rather than merely a substitute 
for, legal institutions in developing economies. The Article concludes by 
suggesting that given the ubiquity of small-world networks in trade, gaining 
a more nuanced understanding of the way they can support exchange should 
make it possible to identify additional contexts in which private ordering is 
likely to be able to meaningfully contribute to contract governance, both in 
the presence and in the absence of a well-functioning public legal system. 
I. THE MAGHRIBI TRADERS AS A SMALL-WORLD NETWORK 
The Maghribi traders were a group of Jewish merchants who engaged 
in long-distance trade across the Islamic Mediterranean in the eleventh 
century.22 They traded in numerous commodities, including flax, copper, 
olive oil, textiles, and wax.23 These merchants sometimes entered into 
partnerships and occasionally hired one another as agents for a wage. More 
commonly, they used one another as reciprocal agents under a legally 
 
 21 See Duncan J. Watts, Networks, Dynamics, and the Small-World Phenomenon, 105 AM. J. SOC. 
493 (1999) (providing a formal definition of a small-world network); see also Qawi K. Telesford et al., 
The Ubiquity of Small-World Networks, 1 BRAIN CONNECTIVITY 367, 367 (2011) (noting that small-
world networks have “unique properties of regional specialization with efficient information transfer”). 
 22 GREIF, PATH, supra note 3, at 61 (defining the Maghribi as a group of Jewish traders whose 
families migrated from Baghdad to North Africa and then fanned out across the Islamic Mediterranean). 
 23 For an overview of the commodities traded, see GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra 
note 10, ch. 8. 
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unenforceable form of agreement known as a suhba.24 Under a suhba, a 
trader who asked his agent to undertake a task on his behalf became obligated 
to perform a task of equal value in return. The tasks exchanged, however, 
could be different in kind or scope.25 A trader of great importance might ask 
a trader of little importance to spend two weeks gathering flax on his behalf. 
In exchange, and in full satisfaction of his obligation, the important trader 
might simply pen a short note introducing his agent to other traders. These 
agency arrangements created significant economic benefits. Freed from the 
need to travel alongside their goods, merchants were able to operate in many 
markets simultaneously and create a diversified portfolio of trading 
activities.26 
What is known about the commercial activities of these traders comes 
from a cache of commercial letters and other documents deposited in the 
Cairo Geniza, a synagogue-connected storage house for documents 
containing the name of God.27 During this period, letters were an important 
means by which information flowed between markets. Merchants used 
letters to instruct their agents, and agents used them to report back to 
merchants. Letters were also used to provide the names of witnesses to 
transactions as well as information about prices, the arrival and departure of 
ships, and other relevant market conditions. The letters “read much like the 
financial pages of a modern day newspaper.”28 
 
 24 “The ‘service for service’ part of this relationship was not subject to contract,” and neither party 
had a “right to sue the other for inaction or inadequate work” or additional money when his efforts went 
beyond what he was obligated to do. Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 21. 
 25 A flavor of the norm of reciprocity that characterized suhba dealings can be gleaned from the 
letters written by Nissim b. Hafon in Alexandria to his suhba partner Nahray Nissim in Fustat. See 
UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letters #13–25. Under a suhba traders made specific 
requests of their agents. However, because trading conditions were highly unstable, agents were 
commonly given a free hand to use their own judgment when unanticipated market changes occurred. See 
Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 77 (concluding that grants of broad authority were consistent 
with “one of the business maxims of the day . . . that ‘one who is present sees what one who is absent 
cannot’”); id at 289 Commercial Letter # 4 (a trader asks Awkal to buy pearls on his behalf, but notes that 
if they “should be scarce this year, . . . you, my master, have a free hand in whatever you decide to 
choose”). 
 26 See Greif, Early Trade, supra note 1, at 528. 
 27 “A geniza is a place where Jews locked away writings on which the name of God was or might 
have been written” until they could be buried in accordance with Jewish law. Greif, Reputations and 
Coalitions, supra note 1, at 859. The Cairo Geniza “contain[ed] about a thousand contracts, price lists, 
traders’ letters, accounts, and other documents that reflect eleventh-century trade in the Muslim 
Mediterranean.” GREIF, PATH, supra note 3, at 60. For a detailed description of the documents in the 
Geniza, see GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 5–11. 
 28 Norman A. Stillman, The Eleventh Century Merchant House of Ibn ‘Awkal (A Geniza Study), 16 J. 
ECON. & SOC. HIST. ORIENT 15, 24 (1973) [hereinafter Stillman, Merchant House]. 
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Seventy percent of the letters contain discussions in which “merchants 
are assessing each other’s conduct – whether past, present, or prospective,”29 
along with the conduct of third parties.30 According to historians, these letters 
are best understood as a form of “substitute speech, allowing each merchant 
to participate in the talk of markets scattered around the Mediterranean.”31 
Commercial news was also carried by itinerant traders. “[T]ravelers’ 
tales” suffused with information about far flung locations circulated widely 
and had the potential to add information; yet merchants were wary of relying 
on “rumors circulating about distant places [that] might be magnified by 
echo. . . . That is, they worried that talk within a small and interested 
community had a tendency to magnify some reports and discount others, in 
keeping with the norms or worries of the group.”32 As one merchant wailed,  
No one has been repudiated as much as I have been, and has been put in 
jeopardy as much as I have. . . . [I]f I had greeted somebody, he would have 
replied: you owe money . . . . Everyone would say it in his fashion. One would 
say: a hundred, and the other: five hundred. . . . These days, . . . it became . . . a 
thousand gold coins.33 
Given the traders’ intuitive understanding of echo, “the business reports 
from travelers that were most valued . . .  were their notes of which other 
ships had departed at the same time, how many ships were still loading, 
which ships had fallen behind – these were eyewitness reports of activity en 
route that could be verified in multiple ways.34 
 
 29 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 78. 
 30 Id. at 79. 
 31 Id.; id. at 83–84 (“The speech-like form of letters made blunt comments about others possible as 
mere hasty words; the semi-public, semi-private nature of letters made it feasible to disseminate such 
comments through a community without making them truly public . . . .”); id. at 64 (“Business 
correspondents shared this sense of the letter as a stand-in for the speaker.”). 
 32 Id. at 197–98. Echo effects may arise when information flows through relatively closed (that is 
small, densely connected) social networks. See RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE AND CLOSURE: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL CAPITAL 167–223 (2007) (discussing echo as a characteristic of closed or 
semi-closed networks and noting that under certain conditions echo can push assessments of an 
individual’s reputation to extremes of good or bad). 
 33 SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #105; id. at Letter #109 (“You know very well that nothing 
is hidden from our friends, and they embellish every fact.”). 
 34 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 198. Nevertheless, some travelling 
traders might have gathered and communicated generalized reputation information more accurately than 
others. For example, some traders were “associated with more than one region, often including 
maintaining a second home.” Id. at 269. And, during the “Ibn ‘Awkal period many (though not all) 
merchants would retain their residence in the Islamic West while perhaps renting a secondary home in 
Egypt . . . .” Id. at 43. Given this, while echo might still have introduced some distortions, these travelling 
merchants would have had the opportunity to observe a great deal of commercial behavior first-hand and 
their desire to maintain their own reputation in both markets would likely have made them attentive to 
moving only reliable and accurate information between them. 
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The largest merchants corresponded with several agents in each of the largest 
trading centers, enabling them to triangulate information. Agents knew that 
their principals would be receiving reports from others in their location and 
that any misreporting of information would be detected. They therefore had 
a strong incentive to report local conditions accurately. 
To understand how a private order system of contract enforcement 
based on network governance might have operated across the large and 
geographically dispersed Maghribi trading area, it is important to reconstruct 
the ties among traders and trading centers that created the pathways through 
which information about trading conditions, trading activities, and reputation 
might have travelled both within and across markets. While the historical 
record does not permit a complete reconstruction of these connections, it 
does offer information about several aspects of the Maghribi trade that 
together make it possible to approximate the overall structure of the relevant 
connections among traders—including information about the trading routes, 
the postal routes, the structures of ties in each local market, the ties among 
the largest overseas traders in each of the main trading centers, as well as the 
ties among the most important institutional intermediaries (the Merchants’ 
Representatives) in each of the main trading centers. 
A. Trading and Postal Routes 
The overall structure of the connections between trading centers might 
be very roughly approximated using either the trading routes or the similar, 
though not identical, postal routes through which many, though by no means 
all, letters were sent.35 Yet because the flow of information—and with it the 
networks’ governance force—appears to have been more closely linked to 
the postal routes than the trading routes (perhaps because the Maghribi 
trusted written communications more than the gossip of the marketplace) the 
postal routes seem to be the more appropriate proxy for the pattern of the 
relevant connections. 
The importance of the postal routes to the flow of business and 
reputation-relevant information is suggested by the finding that agency 
relations involving a location outside the postal routes were far more 
problematic than those that took place within it. When an agent was outside 
the postal routes, there was a “high rate of dissatisfaction – more than 50 
percent of the trading transactions described outside the postal network are 
 
 35 Some merchant letters were sent through the postal system or through one of the private courier 
services that plied similar routes. Other letters were sent with several travelling merchants at the same 
time to increase the likelihood that at least one copy would be delivered. GOLDBERG, TRADE AND 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 351. 
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the subject of either complaint about agent behavior or report of loss.”36 In 
these transactions, “misunderstandings and dissatisfaction abounded” in part 
because the lack of a postal infrastructure resulted in “market blindness,” 
meaning that “the general market price and actions of others couldn’t be 
known through a stream of letters.”37 These types of problems are what 
would be expected if the postal routes were in fact transmitting the type of 
information needed for the force of network governance to play a key role in 
supporting exchange. The most significant routes are those that connected 
the three most important trading centers—Egypt, Sicily and Tunisia;38 they 
are pictured in Appendix A. 
To get a better feel for how information flowed across this network and 
where in the market reputation would have played a more or less significant 
role in bonding trade, it is useful to look in more detail at the pattern of 
connections between traders within local trading centers (clusters), as well 
as the connections among the largest traders and their associates across the 
most important trading centers. Combining this information with the postal 
routes reveals that the Maghribi network was structured as a classic small-
world network—that is, a network in which dense clique-like clusters of 
traders (here the traders in local trading centers) are connected to one another 
by a set of ties (those among the largest overseas traders and among key 
market functionaries) that, while relatively small in number,39 are configured 
in such a way that the average number of nodes (in this case individuals) that 
a trader would have to go through to get information about a random other 
trader in another trading center is nonetheless relatively small. It is a 
structure that, as discussed in Part II below, has potentially strong contract 
governance properties.40 
 
 36 Id. at 196. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 319 (“Travel between Egypt and the markets of Ifrīqiyya [in Tunisia] and Sicily was at the 
heart of the long-distance commodity trade for both generations of eleventh-century Geniza traders.”). 
 39 The Geniza documents, however, provide only a partial picture of the connections among traders 
and trading centers. It is possible that connections between traders and across trading centers were denser 
than can be established on the basis of the historical record. 
 40 A key assumption of Greif’s coalition model is that “[t]he social structure of the Maghribi traders’ 
group was ‘horizontal,’” because “traders functioned as agents and merchants at the same time,” Greif, 
Early Trade, supra note 1, at 539, and “the Maghribi traders group was a homogenous group of middle-
class traders,” Greif, Agenda, supra note 2, at 269. However, there is a great deal of evidence that the 
largest markets had some traders who were demonstrably larger or better connected than others but who 
also dealt with a large number of smaller traders. See infra notes 60–130. The difference is important 
because once the existence of these larger traders is recognized, the ability of a coalition to exclude them 
becomes highly questionable. See infra notes 165–170 and accompanying text. 
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B. Interpersonal Ties 
1. Ties Within Trading Centers 
Within each trading center, the Maghribi were connected by ties of 
business, family, community, and religion.41 Under Muslim rule, minority 
groups were granted wide-ranging autonomy. “The administration of their 
own affairs was left to [the groups] themselves,”42 and the “generally small 
Jewish communities”43 created their own religious and quasi-governmental 
institutions that enabled them to remain a cohesive social group. The 
synagogue was at the center of community life. “[E]veryone attended 
service[s] at least on Saturday . . . .”44 The building was also used for 
community-wide “discussion[s] of public affairs,”45 and “served so many 
cultural and communal purposes that its character as a house of worship 
became blurred.”46 The Maghribi traders were fully integrated into Jewish 
communal life and “formed the professional, commercial, legal, 
administrative, and communal backbone of the Jewish communities where 
they lived.”47 Nevertheless, in their business affairs they dealt primarily 
(though not exclusively) with one another. 
Within each trading center, most exchange was carried out in public and 
semi-public markets. Traders actively sought to have their transactions 
“witnessed by as many trustworthy and easily available persons as 
possible.”48 Goods were also sold at public auction, providing another 
occasion for traders to meet. Together, the social and communal bonds 
among traders49 and the connections formed in their routine work-a-day 
 
 41 See generally 1–5 S. D. GOITEIN, A MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY: THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES 
OF THE WORLD AS PORTRAYED IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CAIRO GENIZA (1967) [hereinafter 
GOITEIN, SOCIETY] (providing a richly detailed account of Jewish life across the Muslim Mediterranean 
with an emphasis on business practices, community structure, religious life, and politics). 
 42 2 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 1–3. 
 43 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 73. 
 44 2 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 1, 55–58. 
 45 Id. at 57. 
 46 Id. at 156. 
 47 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 45; see also Greif, Reputations and 
Coalitions, supra note 1, at 860, 862 (noting that while “the Maghribi immigrants integrated into existing 
Jewish communities” and “did not establish a separate religious-ethnic community,” “they also retained 
a strong sense of identity and solidarity among themselves”). 
 48 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 196. 
 49 Although the Maghribi were careful to “segregate professional reputation from general social 
reputation,” GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 49, their social ties could have 
been conduits for reputation-relevant information. 
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business interactions resulted in a clique-like set of dense ties among the 
Maghribi traders in each locale.50 
In markets with a clique-like structure, information tends to circulate as 
the near costless by-product of everyday interactions. Cliques are the clearest 
and most intuitive context in which the pattern of ties among market 
participants gives rise to what is called a closed network—that is, a context 
in which information about misbehavior becomes quickly and extensively 
known (or knowable) across the relevant group of traders.51 As case studies 
have shown52 and theorists have suggested,53 reputational forces can be an 
effective way of supporting trade within cliques. 
The circulation of information within the main trading centers was also 
facilitated by the large merchants in each center who engaged in extensive 
overseas trading. Their success in these endeavors depended in large part on 
their “belonging to the local economy [in their home market], with a local 
reputation, local connections, . . . personal customs privileges,”54 and access 
to the “legal and credit community.”55 Without these “deep [local] ties,”56 the 
value of the services they could offer their overseas partners would have been 
limited. Overseas partners or overseas traders with whom a local merchant 
had a suhba “hope[d] to profit from all the aspects of his friend’s [that is, his 
fellow trader’s] localism.”57 As a consequence, merchants who engaged in 
overseas trade had an incentive to create and maintain ties in their home 
trading center and to participate actively in the gossip of the marketplace.58 
Finally, a practice of local governments across the trading area gave all 
of the merchants in a particular locale, regardless of their size and 
 
 50 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 83 (“[M]ost of these men [within a 
particular locale] were members of small, close-knit communities bound by multiple social ties . . . .”). 
 51 BURT, supra note 32, at 95 (defining closed networks as “networks in which people are connected 
such that no behavior goes unnoticed”); id. at 97 (noting that “[t]he stronger the third-party ties connecting 
two people, the more closed [is] the network around them”). 
 52 For an example of reputation-based governance within small groups, see Bernstein, Diamonds, 
supra note 20. For the seminal study of the role of small ethnic groups in the support of exchange, see 
Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative 
to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981). 
 53 See S. Nageeb Ali & David A. Miller, Ostracism and Forgiveness, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 2329 
(2016) and sources cited therein. For an overview of the sociological view that embeddedness in general 
can support trade, see Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985). 
 54 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 292–93. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 295. 
 57 Id. at 353. 
 58 Id. at 203 (“Merchants in their home bases were information hubs for travelers: they received 
letters to forward, received notes in their letters asking them to look for, speak to, and report on travelers, 
and . . . served as witnesses who were expected to report back on the activities of travelers.”). 
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prominence, an incentive to remain aware of the activities of other local 
merchants. Throughout the eleventh century, Muslim government officials 
who wanted to “sustain the reputation of the [local] market” sometimes 
required local merchants “to swallow losses when one of their fellows went 
bankrupt so that [foreign merchants] could be paid.”59 Merchants therefore 
had a personal financial stake in helping to ensure the solvency of all traders 
in their locale. 
2. Ties Between Trading Centers 
The Maghribi faced numerous challenges in supporting overseas and 
inter-market trade. The most important trading centers—Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Sicily—were distant from one another.60 The flow of information between 
them was slow and subject to unpredictable disruptions.61 Many things 
outside of the traders’ control—ranging from price volatility to bad weather, 
to political instability, to pirates roaming the seas62—could disrupt even the 
most routine transactions. It was therefore difficult for traders to determine 
on the basis of an undesirable outcome alone whether any malfeasance took 
place. 
Yet a closer look at the trading activities of the largest merchants in 
Egypt, Tunisia, and Sicily, coupled with a closer examination of the 
institutions and organization of the Maghribi trade, reveals that the ties 
across trading centers were configured in a way that helped to ensure that 
information about misbehavior could have spread (or been obtainable) 
widely enough, through only a small number of ties, to transform the entire 
trading area (or at least important subparts of it) into a semi-closed 
network—a context where reputation can be a powerful, if somewhat 
imperfect, way of governing trade. 
The flow of information across the three largest trading centers (Egypt, 
Sicily, and Tunisia) was facilitated by the presence in each center of an 
especially prominent merchant or closely connected group of merchants, 
whose size and scope of operation dwarfed the activities of the average 
merchant.63 The largest merchants were connected to one another both within 
 
 59 Id. at 351. 
 60 Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 44 (noting that it took “a little more than a month” for a 
ship to sail from Egypt to Tunisia, “while the journey overland took far longer”). 
 61 See, e.g., Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 860 (“A journey from Egypt to 
Sicily . . . could take from 13 to 50 days . . . .”). 
 62 See SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #48 (mentioning “great hardships from pirates and other 
matters”); id. at Letter #162 (mentioning pirates). 
 63 Marina Rustow, Tahertī Family, BRILL (2010), https://referenceworks-brillonline-
com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/entries/encyclopedia-of-jews-in-the-islamic-world/taherti-family-
SIM_0020800?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopedia-of-jews-in-the-islamic-
world&s.q=taherti [https://perma.cc/SK22-TAL8] (“Together with the houses of Ibn ʿAwkal, al-Tustarī, 
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and across the major trading centers by business and sometimes family ties. 
These ties created enduring pathways for the transmission of market and 
reputation-related information, which helped to ensure that information 
could either traverse the trading area or be obtained when needed by passing 
through only a small number of merchants. 
The two most significant Maghribi merchants, Ibn Awkal and Nahray 
Nissim, operated out of Fustat (Old Cairo), the most important trading 
center.64 It is their commercial correspondence and the correspondence of 
their closest business associates that comprise the bulk of the letters archived 
in the Geniza.65 To get a feel for the structure of these channels of 
information flow, it is useful to consider the ties among the largest and most 
central merchants in the main trading centers during both the Awkal and 
Nahray generations.66 
a. The Ibn Awkal Generation 
Ibn Awkal, a so-called “merchant prince,”67 was “[t]he most prominent 
[of the] Egyptian merchants in the first third of the eleventh century.”68 He 
was a largely stationary merchant,69 but he traded across the Mediterranean 
 
and Nahray ben Nissim, the Tāhertīs were, in terms of volume of trade, one of the largest and most 
powerful mercantile operations of their era.”). 
 64 See 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 159 (“Cairo during the eleventh century was the 
exclusive metropolis of commerce and finance in Egypt . . . .”); Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 
5, 17, 162 (noting Egypt and Fustat’s central role in the eleventh-century trade across the Muslim 
Mediterranean). 
 65 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 36 (noting that the merchants who 
“wrote or received these [Geniza] letters” were part of the “circles associated with Ibn ‘Awkal and 
Nahray”). 
 66 The connections described in the text and in Figures 1 and 2, infra, were chosen to make the overall 
structure of the Maghribi network clear. Other important channels of communication existed as well. One 
such channel ran through Alexandria and connected Alexandria, Fustat, Sicily, and Tunisia. Ibn Awkal’s 
“chief agent in Alexandria” was Ismail al-Jawhari, Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 293, who was 
the nephew of Awkal’s long-term agent in Tunisia, Majjani, with whom he was in regular contact. Jawhari 
was also in contact with Awkal’s nephew in Sicily. MOSHE GIL, JEWS IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES IN THE 
MIDDLE AGES 686 (David Strassler trans., 2004) (1997) [hereinafter GIL, JEWS]. Awkal had other agents 
in Alexandria as well, including Joseph b. Yeshua, one of his “less important agents,” Stillman, 
Dissertation, supra note 15, at 349, and Abraham b. Joseph, GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter 
#14, who was in contact with Awkal’s nephew in Sicily as well. Id. 
 Nahray also had many business associates in Alexandria. These included Murduk b. Musa, who 
“served as Nahray’s agent and occasional partner,” UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, supra note 15, at 4, 
and who also dealt with the Tahertis, SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #118, and Awwad b. Hananel, 
an “associate of Nahray” to whom he had “kinship and personal ties,” UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 4, and who also had ties to Majjani, id. at Letter #11. 
 67 Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 16. 
 68 GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 679; Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 19. 
 69 Shelomo D. Goitein, Mediterranean Trade Preceding the Crusades: Some Facts and Problems, 
DIOGENES, Sept. 1, 1967, at 47, 55 [hereinafter Goitein, Crusades]. 
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through his many agents and partners.70 In addition to his central role in 
merchant affairs, Awkal’s influence in the Egyptian Jewish community was 
“enormous . . . by virtue of his great wealth,”71 and his role in moving money 
and rabbinic documents across the trading area all the way to Jerusalem.72 
This role further embedded him in the flow of information across the entire 
Maghribi trading area. The ties among Awkal and the largest traders are 
pictured and described below.73 













During the Awkal period, there was a powerful group of Tunisian 
traders74 who were connected to one another by ties of marriage and business. 
This group included the Taherti family, “one of the largest and most 
powerful mercantile operations of their era,”75 who occupied “a true situation 
 
 70 Awkal’s family members travelled widely to conduct business on his behalf. Stillman, Merchant 
House, supra note 28, at 20. 
 71 Elinoar Bareket, Ibn ‘Awkal Family, BRILL (2010), https://referenceworks-brillonline-
com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/entries/encyclopedia-of-jews-in-the-islamic-world/ibn-awkal-
family-SIM_0010170?s.num=0&s.f.s2_parent=s.f.book.encyclopedia-of-jews-in-the-islamic-
world&s.q=awkal [https://perma.cc/55UQ-JJT6]; see also GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 10, at 332 (“Ibn ‘Awkal’s trading . . . was of a magnitude greater than the rest of the group.”). 
 72 Bareket, supra note 71. 
 73 The picture of ties that emerges from the description below is one in which there is a tier of large 
traders with very strong ties to one another, and some traders who, while not particularly wealthy, are 
quite well-connected across markets. See, e.g., infra note 180 (discussing the ties of Yeshua b. Ismael of 
Alexandria). Greif, in contrast, has a different view of the Maghribis’ social structure. See supra note 40 
and sources cited therein. 
 74 Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 5 (“Tunisia in the tenth century rose to a central position 
in the Mediterranean trade.”). 
 75 Rustow, supra note 63. 
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of . . . centrality in the area of international trade;”76 Musa al-Majanni, “the 
son of an important Qayrawanese family”77 who became a “very prominent 
man of affairs”;78 and the Berekeyah family, who operated on a smaller 
commercial scale yet were central in the Maghribis’ communication network 
by virtue of the active role they played in Jewish communal affairs across 
the trading area.79 These traders constituted a group that “appears to [have 
been] a tight party, despite the minor disputes that occasionally broke out 
among them.”80 
Awkal had connections to all three members of this group. He had 
extensive business dealings with the Taherti family.81 Majanni had trained as 
his apprentice and became his long-term agent and business partner.82 The 
two men were said to have enjoyed an extraordinarily “close personal 
relationship.”83 Although Awkal did not trade with the Berekeyahs, they had 
an active, if sometimes contentious, correspondence concerning Jewish 
community affairs.84 
Awkal also had both family and business ties to Sicily.85 His nephew 
lived on the island and often acted as his agent or his partner.86 He also had 
 
 76 GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 693; see also Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 20 
(describing the Tahertis as a “great business house[]”); Rustow, supra note 63 (“[T]he Tāhertīs were, in 
terms of volume of trade, one of the largest and most powerful mercantile operations of their era.”); 
Goitein, Crusades, supra note 69, at 56 (describing the Tahertis as “the most prominent of the 
approximately thirty merchant families from Kairouan [Quayran]”). 
 77 Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 17. 
 78 Id. at 25. 
 79 Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 193–259 (providing letters that reveal the Berekeyahs’ 
role in Jewish communal affairs as well as their connection to Ibn Awkal). 
 80 See GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 691, 696 (describing the ties of marriage and business between 
the Majjanis and Tahertis); id. at 691 (describing ties of marriage and business between the Majjanis and 
the Berekeyahs); see also id. at 688 (describing the ties of marriage and business between the Berekeyahs 
and the Tahertis); 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 181 (ties of marriage); Rustow, supra note 63 
(“The Berekhiah brothers and the Tāhertīs collected the Qayrawan Jewish community’s donations to the 
Baghdad yeshivot and passed them on to Joseph ibn ʿAwkal or Ismāʿīl ben Barhūn al-Tāhertī in 
Fustat . . . .”); Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 82 (noting the ties among the Majjanis, the 
Berekeyahs, and the Tahertis). 
 81 Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 20 (“[T]he Tahertīs of Qayrawan . . . were . . . 
associates [and] sometimes rivals of the House of Ibn ‘Awkal.”). 
 82 Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 50, 79. 
 83 Id. at 79. 
 84 See Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 193–259 (providing translations of several letters from 
the Berekeyah brothers to Ibn Awkal relating to Jewish community concerns that revealed a close but 
difficult relationship between them). 
 85 See Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 49–50 (naming the relatives of Ibn Awkal living in 
Sicily). 
 86 His nephew was Isma’il b. Joseph b. Abi Uqba. SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at xxi; see also id. at 
Letter #46 (where Uqba reports on one of his partnerships with Awkal). 
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a number of other agents,87 including a long-term agent who enjoyed 
particularly high stature both in the community and with the authorities.88 
The Tahertis, too, had extensive business dealings in Sicily (including with 
Awkal’s long-time agent),89 and the Berekeyahs sometimes traveled there as 
well.90 Together these ties created a triangle of connections along the Fustat–
Sicily–Tunisian axis. 
 During the Awkal period, the flow of information among these 
locations was further facilitated by another, partially overlapping, set of ties 
created by the many overseas connections of the other wealthy Fustat-based 
trading family, the Tustaris. The Tustaris were “a prominent house of long-
distance traders, bankers, courtiers, and scholars,”91 whose “mercantile 
correspondence demonstrates the value of their shipments to have been 
unequaled during this period.”92 
The Tustaris did business in Sicily and Tunisia,93 and they had 
“[e]specially close”94 commercial relations with the Tahertis “with whom 
they had extensive export-import business dealings.”95 The Tustaris were 
further embedded in the Maghribi communication network by virtue of the 
central role they played in Jewish communal affairs. In this capacity, they 
corresponded with both the Berkekeyahs and the Tahertis96 about the 
 
 87 For others who acted as Awkal’s partners and agents in Sicily, see id. at Letter #45 (from Abraham 
b. Simhon in Palermo to Awkal), and id. at Letter #33 (a letter to Awkal from Musa b. Isaq Hisda, an 
agent of his in Sicily, discussing a partnership between them as well as various tasks Hisda was to do as 
Awkal’s agent). 
 88 See GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 684 (noting that Ibn Awkal had a long-term agent and sometimes 
partner in Sicily named Abu Said Khalaf (Hayyim) b. Jacob Al-Andalusi, who was “highly praised by 
the Palermo community for his many merits,” and his intercessions with the Muslim government). 
 89 GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 685 (noting that a Taherti was in contact with Awkal’s agent Abu 
Said Khalaf (Hayyim) b. Jacob Al-Andalusi). 
 90 Id. at 688 (noting that one of the Berekeyahs traveled as far as Sicily). 




 92 Id.; 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 164 (“[T]he three senior Tustarī brothers[’] . . . probity 
and success attracted even the attention of Muslim historiography . . . .”); GOLDBERG, TRADE AND 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 176 (“[T]he Tustarī brothers [were] the wealthiest merchants of Egypt 
in their day.”). 
 93 Rustow, Tustarī Family, supra note 91 (noting that the Tustaris had business connections in Sicily 
and Tunisia). 
 94 See GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 696. 
 95 Id. at 668; see also GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, Introduction to Letter #11 (revealing the 
unusually warm relationship between the Tustaris and the Tahertis and noting that the Tahertis report that 
they publicly sang the praises of the Tustaris for giving them help and that they “thanked God for this, 
my lord, in the presence of all those who know you and those who do not know you” (footnote omitted)). 
 96 Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 45 (discussing the Tustaris’ connections to the Berekeyahs 
and Tahertis in relation to Jewish religious affairs). 
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transport of charity, books, and rabbinic writings throughout and beyond the 
Maghribi trading area.97 The Tustaris also had business ties to Awkal.98 The 
web of relationships formed by the Tustaris and their associates created an 
alternative, yet partly overlapping, pathway for information to flow in and 
out of Fustat from the main trading centers. 
In sum, Ibn Awkal had connections to all of the most important 
Maghribi traders of his time; yet to fully understand his correspondence and 
his many and varied business ties, it is important to note that “[m]ost of Ibn 
‘Awkal’s agents were . . . smaller, and not so small, merchants who provided 
services to [him] . . . not for any commission, but in order to request similar, 
reciprocal services from such an influential and well-connected business 
house.”99 
b. The Nahray Generation 
Nahray Nissim was the most prominent merchant active in the second 
half of the century. “[H]is skill, his experience and especially his reputation 
for integrity made him a preferred associate of the most prominent 
Mediterranean merchants of his day.”100 While Nahray was not nearly as 
wealthy as Awkal,101 he was considered the “most versatile [in terms of the 
variety of commercial activities he undertook] of all merchants known . . . 
from the Geniza.”102 Nahray was not only a trader but also a mediator,103 
banker,104 “business agent, legal representative, and intercessor in public 
affairs for his Tunisian compatriots.”105 Like Awkal, Nahray had business 
and family connections across the Fustat–Tunisia–Sicily trading area. These 
connections—together with those formed among his associates—created a 
triangular set of ties across the trading area that provided an enduring 
pathway for the flow of commercial information. 
 
 97 GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 696. 
 98 Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 18 (“[T]he Tustarīs had business dealings with the 
house of Ibn ‘Awkal.”). Historians speculate that Awkal’s daughter married a Tustari. Stillman, 
Dissertation, supra note 15, at 51–52. 
 99 Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 23. 
 100 UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, supra note 15, at 2; see also GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 711 
(“Nehorai [Nahray] enjoyed great esteem and unusual distinction among the groups of merchants dealing 
in international trade, most of them Maghribis; he was knowledgeable and wise, diligent, assiduous and 
faithful.”). 
 101 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 45. 
 102 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 156. 
 103 SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #96 (two large merchants ask Nahray to mediate a dispute). 
 104 Goitein, Crusades, supra note 69, at 53 (describing Nahray as a “merchant banker, engaged in 
changing, money lending and other banking business”). 
 105 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 189. 
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At the start of his career, Nahray apprenticed with his uncle, a powerful 
member of the Taherti family.106 When he became a trader in his own right, 
he settled in Cairo but still “commuted between Tunisia and the eastern 
Mediterranean.”107 Throughout his career, Nahray continued to trade and 
partner with members of the Taherti family,108 and they often kept an eye on 
one another’s affairs.109 
Nahray110 and the Tahertis111 both had strong trading ties to Sicily. On 
Sicily a small group of closely connected “prominent Palermitan Jewish 
merchants”112 played a significant role in both their local market and in cross-
Mediterranean trade. The most important member of this group was Hayyim 
b. Amar, a merchant with strong ties to government authorities. He was also 
the Merchants’ Representative, an important market functionary whose role 
 
 106 Id. at 181 (noting that Nahray’s mother was a Taherti); see also GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 705. 
 107 GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at 145. 
 108 SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #150 (describing a partnership between a Taherti and 
Nahray); id. at Letter #81 (same); id. at Letter #146 (same); id. at Letter #117 (noting a shipment from a 
Taherti to Nahray); id. at Letter #135 (reporting on business affairs between Tahertis and Nahray); id. at 
Letter #180 (noting actions taken in relation to a partnership between a Taherti and Nahray). 
 109 Id. at Letter #97 (where a Taherti describes some issues with goods belonging to Nahray and 
notes that “I stood surety for you”); see also id. at Letter #143 (where a Taherti describes many things he 
did for Nahray and observes that “I am acting for you over here as more than an agent”). 
 110 In addition to the connections discussed in the text, the letters contain references to other 
merchants Nahray dealt with in Sicily, see, e.g., SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #146 (noting that 
Nahray dealt with Judah b. Ismail al-Andalusi a Sicialian merchant); id. at Letter #96 (demonstrating that 
Nahray corresponded with Mevorakh b. Israel in Palermo), and make it clear that Nahray had relatives 
who resided there. Id. at Letter #88 (noting that Nahray had a “maternal uncle in Sicily”); id. at Letter 
#139 (discussing Nahray’s “instructions to his agents and partners in Sicily”). 
 111 See infra notes 116, 122, 125–128; see also SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Introduction to Letter 
#64 (noting that the Tahertis had an agent in Sicily and planned to travel there). 
 112 SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at xxii. 
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is described further below.113 Hayyim’s family and business-based 
connections to other local traders enhanced his local influence.114 His brother 
David was also a well-known merchant with direct commercial connections 
to both Nahray115 and the Tahertis.116 Another brother was a merchant who 
eventually became the Nagid—that is, the head of the local Jewish 
community.117 And his brother-in-law,118 Maymon b. Khalfa, was a 
prominent merchant in his own right,119 who provided Hayyim with a variety 
of services.120 
Nahray121 and the Tahertis122 both had business ties to Hayyim. One 
letter reveals that all three entered into a partnership together.123 Nahray was 
also closely tied to Maymon, who was his long-term agent and sometimes 
partner.124 The Tahertis, too, had business dealings125 and a seemingly warm 
 
 113 In his capacity as Merchants’ Representative, see infra text accompanying notes 131–151, 
Hayyim also played a key role in managing relations with Sicily’s Muslim rulers. See, e.g., GIL, JEWS, 
supra note 66, at 573 (discussing a letter in which Hayyim claimed to intervene with the authorities to 
annul a decree against the foreign merchants). 
 114 See SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at xxix (noting that the Ammars “were engaged in trade between 
Sicily, Egypt and North Africa” and “were either the most important merchant family of Sicily at the 
time, or among its most outstanding and active ones”). 
 115 GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 588; see also SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #154 (discussing 
trade in silk between David b. Ammar and Nahray); GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 588 (discussing relations 
between David b. Ammar and Nahray). 
 116 See SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #143 (describing a transaction suggesting that a Taherti 
is acting as an agent of David (Daud) Ammar). 
 117  Id. at Letters #163 & #164 (mentioning “the appointment of Zakkār b. ‘Ammār [who was also a 
merchant] as Nagid of Sicilian Jewry”). 
 118  Id. at Letter #91. 
 119 See GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 587 (describing Maymon as “one of the most important 
merchants of the period”). 
 120 SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #90 (revealing that Maymon carried purses and letters for 
Hayyim); id. at Letter #103 (noting that Maymon was a witness to one of Hayyim’s deals and suggesting 
implicitly that he reported back to him). 
 121  Id. at Letter #140 (an account by Nahray mentioning a partnership with Hayyim); id. at Letter 
#143 (describing a partnership between Nahray and Hayyim). 
 122 GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 587 (noting that Hayyim had “close trade relations with Nehorai 
[Nahray] Nissim and the Tāhirtīs”); SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Introduction to Letter #144 (noting 
the existence of a partnership between Hayyim and a Taherti); id. at Letter #81 (mentioning tasks that a 
Taherti asked of Hayyim). 
 123 See SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #143 (mentioning a partnership among Nahray, Hayyim, 
and a Taherti). 
 124 Id. (documenting that Maymon was Nahray’s agent); id. at Letter #140 (describing a deal between 
Maymon and Nahray); id. at Letter #70 (revealing that Maymon carried a purse of coins for Nahray); id. 
at Letter #81 (mentioning accounts between Maymon and Nahray). 
 125 See, e.g., id. at Letter #143 (mentioning a business deal between the Tahertis and Maymon). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1030 
personal connection to Maymon.126 During this era, the Tahertis maintained 
their connection to the Tustaris (who seem to have traded with Hayyim, 
too127) and helped Nahray create business and communal ties with them as 
well.128 
Nahray was also widely renowned for his religious knowledge. Like 
Awkal, he played a central role in the communal and charitable affairs of the 
Jewish communities throughout the trading area.129 The ties created by these 
activities further enhanced his ability to both obtain and transmit reputation-
relevant information not only within Fustat, but also throughout and beyond 
the Fustat–Sicily–Tunisia axis.130 
In sum, during both the Awkal and Nahray generations, the connections 
these large traders had within their local trading centers—coupled with the 
ties they maintained with one another across the main trading centers—put 
them in an ideal position to obtain and spread information about traders’ 
reputation-relevant activities, prices, and other aspects of the market 
throughout (and sometimes beyond) the Fustat–Sicily–Tunisia trading area. 
The overall structure of these ties created a semi-closed network across the 
trading area which transmitted information well enough for reputation to 
play a central role in supporting trade. 
C. Quasi-Institutional Ties 
The flow of information within and across markets also appears to have 
been facilitated by institutional functionary known as the “Merchants’ 
Representative.”131 The Merchants’ Representative was a stationary 
merchant who could be found in both major trading centers132 and small 
 
 126 Id. at Letter #149 (where, after learning of a shipwreck, a Taherti notes that “I am worried over 
our men who had been on board. . . . My greatest pain is in regard to Maymūn . . . I hope that he himself 
is safe”). 
 127 See id. at Letter #149 (discussing a transaction involving a Taherti, a Tustari, and Hayyim). 
 128 GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 705 (noting that Nahray’s uncle, a Taherti, helped him forge ties 
with the Tustaris). 
 129 For an overview of these activities, see id. at 715–21. 
 130 SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #62. 
 131 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 186–92 (providing an overview of the role of the 
Merchants’ Representative and suggesting that “[t]he gap left by informal cooperation was filled by the 
professional representative of the merchants”). Another functionary who would also have been well-
positioned to transmit the type of information that would have facilitated reputation-based trade within 
local trading centers was the dallal. A dallal acted as a “broker, auctioneer, or middleman . . . . He cried 
out the goods offered for sale in the bazaar and brought them to the knowledge of customers in other 
ways.” GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at 14. 
 132 Some major trading centers, including Fustat, had more than one Wakil. See Goitein, Crusades, 
supra note 69, at 61. 
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“provincial towns.”133 He was typically “a successful merchant of means who 
himself had come from a foreign country or was the son of such a person, 
but who had lived long enough in his new domicile to become well 
entrenched there and influential.”134 
Within his local market, the Merchants’ Representative provided 
“organization and oversight for the community he served,”135 much like a 
modern trade association. His warehouse functioned as “a neutral meeting 
ground for the merchants, [and] it served them also as a bourse.”136 He would 
“organize auctions” and arrange for notaries to be present when goods 
arrived or were exchanged so that traders could “register and settle 
contracts.”137 He would “even negotiate goods through customs.”138 
He also played the role of post office, receiving, storing, distributing, 
and sometimes copying the mail.139 This gave him valuable information 
about who was dealing with whom,140 and, perhaps more importantly, who 
had ceased to communicate with a former trading partner. The letters reveal 
that failure of a business partner to communicate by letter or any significant 
delay in communication made traders anxious. They took it as a signal that 
the silent trader was displeased by his agent or partner’s actions.141 
The Merchants’ Representative also “offered a variety of commercial 
services to foreign merchants for a fee,”142 including acting as a sales broker 
for goods arriving from overseas.143 He would sometimes act as a third party 
in overseas partnerships, receiving, selling, and collecting payment for goods 
 
 133 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 190. 
 134 Id. at 192. Merchants’ Representatives “differed widely with regard to the power and influence 
they wielded.” Id. at 191. 
 135 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 111. 
 136 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 188. 
 137 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 112, 168.  
 138 Id. at 112. 
 139 Id. at 65, 112. 
 140 Id. at 87 (noting that the arrival of a letter “seems to have been a primary indicator to merchants 
themselves . . . that two men had a functioning association, a suhba”). 
 141 See GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter #12 (“Letters from you should arrive here all the 
time to keep us assured of your welfare. For we are disquieted until we receive letters telling us how you 
have been and how you are.” ); see also infra notes 167–169 (giving examples of how traders reacted 
when Awkal or Nahray were slow in responding to letters). 
 142 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 112. 
 143 Partners sometimes gave their goods to a Wakil to sell, presumably to ensure that a proper price 
was received. See 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 187–88 (“When a participant in a partnership 
went abroad, he would not (or not in all cases) send the goods purchased there to the store of his partner, 
but to a wakīl [that is, a Merchants’ Representative], who would either store or sell them . . . . The money 
thus obtained could be left with him as well.”). 
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on behalf of the partnership. He also acted as an “agent of last resort”144 for 
foreign merchants, engaging in a wide variety of tasks, including ensuring 
the delivery of arriving goods to the receiving agent’s place of business.145 It 
was not uncommon for foreign merchants to appoint him (via a power of 
attorney) as their legal representative to aid in their debt collection efforts.146 
In addition, he sometimes acted as a “neutral arbiter” when disputes arose.147 
The Merchants’ Representative’s many roles put him in a good position to 
collect information about the creditworthiness and trustworthiness of many 
local and overseas traders as well as information about prices and market 
conditions both in his location and in other trading centers.148 
The Merchants’ Representative had an incentive not only to aggregate 
information but also to do so accurately. His stature both within his local 
community and with the local ruling government was highly dependent on 
his ability to attract business from overseas merchants.149 Overseas 
merchants would only trade in a market if they could access reliable 
reputation-related information and could trust their agents there not to cheat. 
A Merchants’ Representative who wanted to retain his advantaged position 
therefore had an incentive to ensure the accuracy of the market news and the 
information about merchant behavior that he transmitted both within and 
across trading centers.150 
Given their position in their local trading area, the commonly accepted 
qualifications for the job, the many roles they played in facilitating and 
intermediating trade, as well as their connections to the trading networks of 
the most important traders like Awkal and Nahray,151 the Merchants’ 
 
 144 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 112; see also GOITEIN, LETTERS, 
supra note 15, at 14–15 (noting that a key function “of the representative of the merchants was essentially 
the protection of the interests of persons who were absent from a town or were foreigners there”). 
 145 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 112. 
 146 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 187. 
 147 Id. 
 148 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 180 (noting that a Merchants’ 
Representative tended to be “informed of the movement of goods, their ownership, their storing, and the 
agency plans of members of their group, the ashābunā,” that is, the Maghribi Traders). 
 149 Id. at 169. 
 150 Two aspects of the market likely enhanced the accuracy of the information transmitted by the 
Merchants’ Representative. First, some trading centers had more than one Merchants’ Representative. 
1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 19; GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 
111. This would have created competition among them to attract business by providing the most accurate 
information and would have deterred the deliberate transmission of inaccurate information given the 
enhanced risk that it would be detected. Second, the information provided by a Merchants’ Representative 
was much less likely than the gossip circulating informally through a market to be distorted by the force 
of echo since the Merchants’ Representative was well-positioned to acquire information from his own 
direct observations. 
 151 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 139. 
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Representatives were perfectly positioned to play the role of network broker. 
They were trusted in both their home market and foreign markets and could 
therefore “clear” sticky information about transactors’ reputations across 
different trading centers,152 thereby contributing, as discussed in Part II, to 
the ability of a system of multilateral reputation-based sanctions to 
effectively support trade. 
D. The Importance of a Trader and His Agent’s Position in the Network 
The Maghribi had an intuitive understanding of the importance of a 
trader’s position in the relevant network of traders. They even had a special 
word for it: jah. A trader’s jah was a measure of his “pull” and personal 
connections. “The primary semantic range of jāh as reputation includes 
‘social rank’, ‘standing’, and ‘prestige,’” as well as “the breadth and strength 
of a merchant’s personal ties” to other merchants.153 A trader’s jah 
determined his access to both information and markets. It therefore strongly 
influenced the value and type of services he could provide to his trading 
partners. As one of Ibn Awkal’s agents noted in explaining why he wished 
to continue their relationship despite its many tensions, “[I]t is my desire to 
avail myself of your jah for those things I send you.”154 
A trader’s jah also determined his ability to transmit information to 
other traders and markets. It therefore affected the magnitude of the 
reputational sanction he could impose on his trading partners. In network 
terminology, jah is a rough approximation of network centrality. Centrality 
is a network metric that can be used to understand where reputation-based 
constraints are likely to be stronger or weaker within a network. A trader 
who is central in a network has “a large number of connections to [traders], 
which, in turn, are each linked to many other [traders].”155 The governance 
value of centrality “lies in the ability of [a] centrally positioned [trader] to 
reduce incentive conflicts after the contract has been initiated by threatening 
(implicitly) to sanction opportunistic behavior,”156 by transmitting negative 
information to his other connections (and indirectly some of their 
 
 152 See BURT, supra note 32, at 11–28 (discussing the role of a network broker). 
 153 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 34. Jah was also important for non-
reputational reasons, as a trader with more jah could likely provide a wider range of services and contacts 
than a trader with less jah. 
 154 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 174 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 155 David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic Alliances, 
23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 242, 249 (2006). For an overview of the most important measures of network 
centrality, see MATTHEW O. JACKSON, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC NETWORKS 37–43 (2008) (Section 
2.2.4: Centrality). 
 156 Robinson & Stuart, supra note 155, at 249. 
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connections as well).157 The more jah a merchant had, the larger the sanction 
he could impose (holding constant the jah of his agent or partner) on his 
business associates if they misbehaved.158 
The letters reveal that traders with a great deal of jah were able to 
damage the reputation of traders who wronged them. This can be seen in the 
correspondence of Ibn Awkal. Awkal was the best-connected merchant in 
the most central trading center (Fustat) and had more jah than any trader in 
his generation. The extent of the reputational harm he could impose on an 
agent is reflected in a letter where a merchant, whose reputation was badly 
 
 157 The effect of centrality on contract governance has been empirically demonstrated. Studies show 
that central transactors tend to forgo contract bonding and governance protections that peripheral traders 
routinely include in their agreements. This suggests that the connections arising from network position 
play a substantially equivalent bonding role in these transactions. A contemporary illustration of the 
relationship between network centrality and network governance comes from a study of 38,000 research 
and development alliances between large pharmaceutical companies and small biotech startups. See id. 
at 242. The study found that the more central the big pharmaceutical company was in the network of such 
firms, the less likely it was to take an equity stake (a common governance provision in such agreements) 
in the biotech firm. It also found that when the pharmaceutical company did take an equity stake, the size 
of the stake went down as the centrality of either the pharmaceutical company or the biotech increased. 
These findings suggest that in these alliances, the governance force generated by network centrality and 
equity stakes may be at least partial substitutes. 
 Another study of a large interfirm network looked at ties arising from 22,039 information technology 
(IT) outsourcing agreements entered into from 1989 to 2008. See Kiron Ravindran, Anjana Susarla, Deepa 
Mani & Vijay Gurbaxani, Social Capital and Contract Duration in Buyer-Supplier Networks for 
Information Technology Outsourcing, 26 INFO. SYS. RES. 379 (2015). The study explored whether there 
was any connection between either clients’ or vendors’ network position and the stated term-length of the 
transaction. Given the many aspects of an IT transaction that are non-contractible and the vulnerable 
position of the client (who, a few months or years into the agreement might have little in-house IT capacity 
remaining), contractual length is a reasonable proxy for transactors’ (most importantly clients’) faith that 
the governance devices employed could adequately bond the transaction, with longer contract terms 
indicating a higher level of trust. The study found a statistically significant positive association between 
how central vendors and clients were in the overall network of firms and the length of their contracts, but 
noted that the client’s centrality had a far larger impact on term-length than the vendor’s centrality. Id. at 
393. The study concluded that network governance was an important force in the global market for IT 
outsourcing, explaining that the “network functions as a conduit of reputation . . . [and] plays a role in 
ensuring that contractual obligations are self-enforcing . . . [by] providing a mechanism for community 
enforcement . . . [and] prevent[ing] the potential for opportunism.” Id. at 395. 
 For examples of additional studies exploring the connection between network position and contract 
governance, see, for example, Gerrit Rooks, Werner Raub, Robert Selten & Frits Tazelaar, How Inter-
Firm Co-operation Depends on Social Embeddedness: A Vignette Study, 43 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 123 
(2000); Gerrit Rooks, Werner Raub & Frits Tazelaar, Ex Post Problems in Buyer–Supplier Transactions: 
Effects of Transaction Characteristics, Social Embeddedness, and Contractual Governance, 10 J. MGMT. 
GOV. 239, 253 (2006); and Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network 
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015) (qualitative study of network 
governance in contracts between original equipment manufacturers and their suppliers of component parts 
in the American Midwest). 
 158 The credibility of a merchant’s threat to impose a reputational sanction, like terminating dealings, 
would increase as the number of agents (with similar sets of connections) that he had in the misbehaving 
agent’s location increased, since the jah he would lose from terminating the agent would be smaller. 
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damaged by an action Awkal took in response to the agent’s perceived 
misdeeds, complains to Awkal that as a result of his actions “letters filled 
with condemnation have [now] reached everyone. My reputation is being 
ruined.”159 
Merchants appeared to have been aware of Awkal’s ability to sanction 
them. They sometimes willingly absorbed a loss or took additional 
precautions simply to avoid the risk of his disapproval.160 Even Awkal’s 
nephew-agent in Palermo was afraid of displeasing him. After losing money 
on some bales of flax that he handled as his uncle’s agent, the nephew 
transferred some profit he earned on his own account into a separate 
partnership he had with his uncle, even though he was not required to do so. 
As he explained, “[t]he pepper was included into the jointly-held 
merchandise in order to offset the loss on the flax, and the silk was included 
in the partnership against the loss from the torn bales.”161 
Merchants also took losses to avoid displeasing Nahray Nissim.162 Like 
Awkal, Nahray had more jah than any trader of his generation. As one agent, 
who had incurred a large loss on a purchase of wheat for Nahray, emphasized 
when reporting to him on the status of his goods, “I will not inflict any loss 
on you nor will I charge anything against your account.”163 Given the 
reputational harm larger traders could inflict and the difficulty of sorting out 
responsibility given the many things beyond traders’ control that could 
disrupt ordinary transactions, it was not uncommon for their agents to plan 
to overperform to avoid providing any grounds for suspicion of shirking. As 
one of Nahray’s agents explained, “I am doing even more than you asked me 
to with respect to the olive-oil, the soap and the other items.”164 
 
 159  Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 270; see also infra note 180 (describing various steps 
that the agent took to assuage Awkal’s anger). 
 160 For example, when one of Awkal’s agents received a letter from Awkal suggesting that he had 
not followed Awkal’s instructions and had made a profit at Awkal’s expense, the agent took steps to 
attempt to protect his reputation. First, he ensured that the next action he took on Awkal’s behalf—
packing bales of flax—was witnessed. He then asked the witnesses to write up their observations and he 
included their letters with the bales of flax. Second, the agent assured Awkal that he would not suffer a 
loss on the deal, noting that “[i]t is not within me that I would make any profit which would come to me 
from this if /you/ yourself would not be pleased. I would not wish such a thing.” Stillman, Dissertation, 
supra note 15, at 366 (a letter from Musa b. Ishaq b. Hisda to Ibn Awkal). 
 161 See id. at 387, 394 (a letter from Awkal’s nephew to Awkal). 
 162 The fear of a larger trader’s ability to impose reputational harms appears to have been justified as 
Nahray did write reputation-damaging letters to third parties, including associates of his agents. See 
SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #108 (where an upset Salma b. Musa told Nahray that “Cohen told 
me things and let me read your letter, sir, and grieved me,” after which Salma demanded, “You must tell 
me to my face, sir, when you have a complaint, and I shall yield to you, as long as there are relations of 
reciprocity between us”). 
 163 See UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter #8. 
 164 See id. at Letter #5. 
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How exactly a very central trader’s own jah (rather than the jah of his 
trading partner) influenced his own propensity to behave when acting as a 
partner or an agent is a complex question that has not yet been adequately 
answered by network theorists. It would likely depend on the relative jah of 
both parties, the relative importance of each of their markets, and the number 
and strength of the connections between their markets. 
In some contexts, central transactors can be strongly disciplined by 
network governance. The more central a transactor is in a network, the more 
visible their actions will be to others, and the quicker any wrongdoing they 
do engage in is likely to become known through the network.165 Conversely, 
central transactors will often have so much status and reputation that a small 
peripheral party may not be able to meaningfully damage the reputation of a 
central transactor, especially if that transactor generally behaves acceptably. 
In addition, the loss to a small trader’s jah from terminating a relationship 
with a central trader may well have been so significant that smaller traders 
might often have been better off maintaining somewhat problematic ongoing 
relationships with large well-connected traders, even if it meant accepting 
occasional losses. Given these considerations, it would likely have been very 
difficult for small merchants (especially those located far from Fustat) to use 
gossip to damage the reputations of central traders like Ibn Awkal or Nahray 
Nissim in the event they misbehaved.166 
The letters reveal that the largest merchants were not, as a general 
matter, perfectly disciplined by reputational concerns—they are replete with 
hints and occasional outright accusations demonstrating that the behavior of 
these merchants was not always above reproach. The letters indicate that 
 
 165 For example, if a firm like Nike is found to use a subcontractor who permits child labor in their 
factory, the impact on Nike is likely to be far greater than it would be if a similar thing happened to a no-
name generic company. 
 166 If, however, a large central trader engaged in serious misbehavior, his agent might not have been 
wholly without recourse. If a small peripheral trader wanted to damage the reputation of a central trader 
in Fustat, he could have travelled to Fustat or appointed a representative to make a claim on his behalf in 
front of the partially merchant-staffed mediation panel that was run adjunct to the Jewish court system. If 
the mediators made a suggested settlement in the small merchant’s favor, the larger merchant would be 
likely to comply since the respect accorded the panel meant that his own reputation might well have been 
hurt by noncompliance. Historians disagree about how often this route was chosen. For an argument that 
it was common and an overview of how it worked, see generally PHILLIP I. ACKERMAN-LIEBERMAN, THE 
BUSINESS OF IDENTITY: JEWS, MUSLIMS, AND ECONOMIC LIFE IN MEDIEVAL EGYPT (2014). 
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both Awkal167 and Nahray168 were slow correspondents (even when they were 
not angry at their agents), and were sometimes either negligent or quite slow 
in taking care of the affairs of their agents.169 Awkal in particular was known 
to be a very difficult man to deal with.170 
Yet the faults of Awkal and Nahray were usually pointed out politely 
and indirectly.171 Complaints were often accompanied by suggested excuses, 
so that difficulties could be resolved with no express acknowledgement of 
 
 167 For examples of Awkal’s slow response to letters, see GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter 
#14 (where an agent of Awkal’s with whom relations appeared to be smooth writes, “I have written you 
a letter before, but have seen no answer. Happy preoccupations—I hope. . . . I have no doubt that you 
have sent me a letter containing all the quotations”), and SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #34 (where 
one of Ibn Awkal’s trading partners mentions another merchant who “had no letter from you [Ibn] on any 
of these boats and reprimanded me for the disregard”). 
 168 For examples of Nahray’s slow response to letters, see SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #98 
(noting that Nahray failed to respond to two letters and has also “failed to write . . . about the arrival of 
the mats”); id. at Letter #92 (“Cohen is sending you his regards. He wrote you [Nahray] several letters, 
but had no reply.”); id. at Letter #97 (a Taherti notes that he had urged Nahray to write certain letters, but 
he did not); id. at Letter #129 (“I have not heard from you [Nahray] for a long time. May the Lord keep 
you busy with good things . . . .”); id. at Letter #154 (where the brother of the Merchants’ Representative 
of Sicily writes to Nahray, “(I hope) everything will turn out well, and that you will treat us as we expect 
and act for us in this matter (we wrote) but had no reply”); UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, supra note 15, 
at Letter #11 (“I am weary of having to remind you to send me the remainder, and not receiving any reply 
from you. . . . You must answer this letter of mine.”); id. at Letter #14 (“I inform you my lord [Nahray] 
that since the day I left you I have not received any letter from you.”); and id. at Letter #17 (“I have not 
received any letter from you [Nahray] nor have I received any instructions . . . . I have been distressed on 
this account . . . .”). 
 169 See, e.g., SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #109 (where Nahray’s long-term agent Maymon 
accuses him of trying to avoid notifying him of a loss and of not working all that hard, saying, “I know 
that it is your habit and in your nature to take care of people’s needs. So I (can only) conclude: This is 
my luck and fate and you are not to blame”); id. at Letter #142 (where an agent of Nahray’s implores him 
to send some goods and an invoice to someone, emphasizing that “[t]his is my main request of you and 
then I shall leave you alone ‘on land and on sea.’ Do not look for excuses because I shall not accept 
any.”); id. at Letter #88 (where an agent notes that he has sent Nahray many requests relating to actions 
he wanted him to take with respect to his goods, but did not get any reply); id. at Letter #153 (suggesting 
that Nahray had not taken the proper steps to sell the agent’s mascara, noting “I read what you wrote with 
reference to the mascara. I am surprised. I asked you for a whole year to do me a favour in regard to this 
mascara. In every letter to me you wrote: the mascara has not yet been sold. I do not know what business 
I have with this mascara and I do not know what you mean,” and also mentioning that others were upset 
with Nahray, noting that someone told him that “[o]ur friend R. Nehorai [Nahray] did not act in a manner 
fitting the way in which he should treat people like us”); id. at Letter #156 (where an important agent of 
Nahray’s in Sicily writes, “I hope you sold the Tustari (cloth). Pay attention!”); see also GIL, JEWS, supra 
note 66, at 706 (quoting a letter from a Taherti to Nahray saying “my brother, you know how much love 
I have for you and your standing with me; yet if there be sloppiness in the purchases that I need, I will 
arrange for my brother . . . to come or I will come myself” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 170 As Awkal’s biographer noted, “[I]t would appear both from his business and communal 
correspondence that Joseph b. Awkal was at times a difficult man to deal with.” Stillman, Dissertation, 
supra note 15, at 64. 
 171 See, e.g., SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #129 (writing to Nahray, “I have not heard from 
you for a long time. May the Lord keep you busy with good things . . .”). 
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wrongdoing. As one of Nahray’s agents put it in a letter that pointed out that 
Nahray had not done what he was supposed to do, “I (can only) conclude: 
This is my luck and fate and you are not to blame.”172 On rare occasions, 
these points were made more directly. As a merchant said to Nahray to 
encourage him to deal with his business promptly, “This is my main request 
of you and then I shall leave you alone ‘on land and on sea.’ Do not look for 
excuses because I shall not accept any.”173 And, as one of the Tahertis 
cautioned him, “Send me quickly all you bought, do not be negligent . . . .”174 
But even when traders (both large and small) expressed extreme upset at the 
actions of a trader like Awkal or Nahray, they tended to indicate their desire 
to continue their commercial relationship.175 
E. Methodological Caution 
Recognizing the difficulty a small trader would have faced in 
attempting to sanction a large central trader—like Awkal, Nissim, or a 
Taherti—suggests that caution is warranted in drawing definitive empirical 
conclusions about the effectiveness of private ordering across the trading 
area as a whole on the basis of the Geniza letters. The network approach—
by highlighting the importance of a trader and his agent’s respective 
positions in the network to predicting how well reputation-based network 
governance is likely to have constrained their behavior—reveals a bias in the 
Geniza letters which suggests that they may provide an overly optimistic 
account of the effectiveness of this governance mechanism across the 
Maghribi trading area as a whole.176 
Eighty-five percent of the letters in the Geniza were received by 
Awkal,177 Nissim, or other Fustat-based traders they dealt with directly. This 
is significant because smaller traders located outside of Egypt dealing with 
 
 172 Id. at Letter #109. 
 173 Id. at Letter #142. 
 174 Id. at Letter #143. 
 175 The idea that the network was less successful in constraining the actions of the largest traders is 
further supported by the historians’ observation that “[t]he more important a person was the more difficult 
it was to enforce payment.” 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 258. 
 176 Historians differ on their view of the representativeness of the Geniza documents. SIMONSOHN, 
supra note 15, at xiii (“There is no way of telling whether [the Geniza documents] are truly representative 
or not, and if they do contain a bias, how they deviate from the norm.”); Greif, Early Trade, supra note 
1, at 526 (“[I]t is reasonable to conjecture that the documents found in the geniza contain a representative 
sample of their [the traders’] commercial correspondence.”); see also GOLDBERG, TRADE AND 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 200–01 (noting that 95% of the Geniza letters were sent to Egypt, but 
concluding that “[t]he degree to which this distorts our picture is debatable”). 
 177  GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 200; Stillman, Merchant House, 
supra note 28, at 22 (noting that although many letters that were sent to Awkal were preserved in the 
Geniza, “no letters from the House of Ibn ‘Awkal have been preserved”). 
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these central Fustat merchants or those closely connected to them would 
have been the Maghribi traders who were least likely to misbehave when 
acting as agents for these important Fustat traders.178 After all, these large 
Fustat-based traders were so central in both their local areas and in the 
trading network as a whole that they (or their direct associates whose 
correspondence also appears in the Geniza) could easily have destroyed the 
reputation of any average-size agents who decided to cheat them, something 
that would have been harder and more costly for two less central (or two very 
central179) transactors to do to one another. It is certainly possible that the 
structure of ties among smaller and/or less central traders engaged in either 
local or long-distance trade, might have made it possible for network 
governance to have constrained wrongdoing among them. All of the 
preconditions necessary for reputation to have played a core role in 
governing trade appear to have been present; yet given the limits of the 
Geniza documents, it is impossible to definitively establish that reputation 
was in fact successful in doing so. 
In thinking about the importance of this bias for understanding the way 
reputation-based network governance operated among the Maghribi traders, 
it is notable that the five letters that Greif and his historian critics look to in 
their longstanding debates over the existence of the traders’ coalition and the 
power of reputational sanctions all involve sanctions imposed by a large 
merchant and/or a merchant who occupied a central role in the flow of 
information.180 
 
 178 See GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 87 (“It is telling that such missives 
[from the West that arrived in Alexandria and were forwarded to Fustat were] from merchants whose 
dealings were on a smaller scale than those of the recipients, who were more important.”). 
 179 Consider, for example, a problem that arose between Ibn Awkal and the Tahertis. Awkal had sent 
a shipment of silver to Tunisia and asked the Tahertis to send it to be sold in Spain, where he thought it 
would get a better price. The Tahertis ignored these instructions and instead melted down the silver for 
their own purposes. The families continued to deal with one another for the next four years despite this 
incident. 
 180 The two letters that Greif puts forth as the best “direct documentary evidence” of “the implicit 
contract within the coalition” both involve reputational harm that was or might have been imposed by a 
large trader—Ibn Awkal, the “merchant prince” in the first letter, and the Merchants’ Representative of 
Sicily, Hayyim b. Ammar, and Nahray in the second. Greif, Reputation and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 
868. 
 The first letter was written to Ibn Awkal by Samhun b. Da’ud, one of his Tunisian-based trading 
partners. GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter #1. The letter describes the reputational harm 
Samhun suffered when Awkal, thinking that Samhun had done him wrong, “withheld payment” from 
Samhun’s creditors in Fustat without communicating to them Samhun’s willingness to pay. Samhun notes 
that as a result “letters vituperating me have now come here to everyone and my honor has been 
disgraced.” Another part of the same letter reveals that Samhun (like Awkal’s other agents) feared 
Awkal’s ability to damage his reputation. In response to Awkal’s claim (made in an earlier letter) that he 
had dealt improperly with a load of Brazilwood, Samhun emphasizes that he very much needs Awkal’s 
help in business and that he “did not take it [the Brazilwood] for myself, nor have I made any profit from 
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it. Rather, it caused me losses.” Samhun also indicates that he took a further loss on a load of silk, even 
paying a debt of Awkal’s with his own money because “of my esteem for you and because of your 
illustrious position.” This letter suggests that some of Awkal’s partners overperformed their contracts, 
perhaps out of fear of the reputational harm he could impose if he were displeased. Just as witnessing 
could protect a trader from false claims of nonperformance or underperformance, so too could protecting 
one’s principal from a loss, or giving one’s partner a greater share of profit than due him, since the 
premium might remove concerns relating to underperformance. 
 The second letter, dated 1055, was from Avon B. Sadaqa to Hayyim b. Ammar, the Merchants’ 
Representative of Sicily. Hayyim had received a letter from an unidentified person telling him that Avon, 
who lived in Jerusalem, had done something wrong (exactly what is a matter of dispute among historians, 
see GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 87 n.85), and Hayyim responded by telling 
Avon that he was “ashamed” to have received letters from him. Avon responded to Hayyim noting that 
he had been widely yet unjustifiably excoriated for his action. See SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter 
#105. He implored Hayyim to ignore the tales of his alleged wrongdoing and to refrain from further 
“spread[ing] the current slanders,” and hurting him through “clever behaviour and conduct.” Id. Avon 
had expected Hayyim to stand up for him, perhaps because before moving to Jerusalem Avon’s family 
had spent time in Palermo. See UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, supra note 15, at 5. As Avon explained, 
“It was your duty—because you know me and in view of the friendship and the partnership that used to 
exist between us . . . to believe in my innocence and not to spread the current slanders.” SIMONSOHN, 
supra note 15, at Letter #105; see also GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 587 (noting that Avon had “close 
trade relations” with Hayyim). Avon also expressed agitation that Nahray was not responding to his 
letters, surmising that he “does not want to risk the condemnation” that might result from revealing their 
association. SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #105. Avon notes that even if Nahray does not reply to 
his letters, he wants him to read them to hear his side. Again, neither Hayyim nor Nahray were harmed 
directly by Avon’s activities, yet it is his reputation with these large traders in particular that seems to 
concern Avon. Interestingly, Avon continued to deal with Hayyim and Nahray. See SIMONSOHN, supra 
note 15, at Letter #126 (a letter from Abun [Avon] to Nahray written in 1059, four years after the events 
in question). And subsequent to these events, Avon took care of an ailing relative of Nahray’s in 
Jerusalem. UDOVITCH, NAHRAY LETTERS, supra note 15. Similarly, Avon continued to correspond with 
Hayyim b. Ammar, see SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #126 (a letter written in 1059, from Abun 
to Nahray, enclosing a letter to Hayyim b. Ammar and asking Nahray to forward it). 
 The three additional letters that Greif offers as “indirect” evidence of the coalition are also ones in 
which the person imposing the sanction or whose condemnation is feared is an important trader and/or 
occupies a position of centrality in the network. 
 In one letter, Maymon b. Khalfa in Palermo writes to his trading partner and long-time suhba partner 
Nahray, coming to the defense of another Palmaterian trader who Nahray evidently thought had wronged 
him. See SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #109. Maymon pleads with Nahray not to damage the 
trader’s reputation, saying, “As you know he is our agent and this (affair) worries all of us,” and noting 
that it was another of Nahray’s partners who was to blame for the difficulties. The letter makes clear that 
Maymon believed that Nahray had the ability to impose severe reputational harm, but also indicates that 
if he did so against an innocent trader, the trader’s local compatriots might well stand up for him. Although 
Maymon’s rebuke to Nahray was quite direct, this might have been possible because Maymon was “one 
of the most important merchants of the period,” GIL, JEWS, supra note 66, at 587, and because he and 
Nahray had a long-term suhba. In addition, Maymon was the brother-in-law of the Merchants’ 
Representative of Palermo, and as discussed above, supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text, 
Merchants’ Representatives were very concerned with maintaining the reputations of local traders, since 
the aggregate reputation of a market had a strong effect on the willingness of overseas merchants to do 
business there, and a Merchants’ Representative’s standing with the local authorities depended on how 
well he upheld the reputation of the marketplace. 
 The final two examples involve merchants who occupy central places in the network, a network 
position that, as discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 155–157, should give them the 
ability to impose, threaten to impose, or attempt to remediate reputational harm. Consider first the 
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exchange of letters between Khalluf b. Musa, a substantial merchant in Palermo, and Yeshua b. Ismail in 
Alexandria. See GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letters #23 & #24. Yeshua was not a notably big 
trader, but was very well-connected within the Maghribi network and has been described as an “up-and-
coming” trader. GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 120. He was an agent of Musa 
Majjani, a very large merchant in Tunisia, see GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at 119; he had extensive 
ties to Nahray and had a suhba with him that lasted forty years, see GOLDBERG, TRADE AND 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 131. He had connections to the Merchants’ Representative of Sicily, see 
SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letters #144 & #149, was related to, GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, 
at 120, and did business with the Tahertis, id. at Letter #106 (discussing business with the Tahertis); id. 




 In his letter, Khalluf responds to two accusations of wrongdoing. First, he responds to a claim that he 
sold Yeshua’s goods and kept the money for himself. In response, he notes that he “showed your letter to 
people and then showed them the blessed goods you had here with me” and that he “took out all your 
goods in the presence of a number of our friends and delivered them to Tammām . . . so that you should 
be reassured.” GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter #23. Second, seemingly in response to a claim 
that he sold pepper too low, he notes that that after he sold Yeshua’s pepper, the price rose and he sold 
his own pepper at a higher price but “transferred the entire sale to our partnership,” since he “would not 
like to take the profit for myself.” Id. In his reply letter, Yeshua also describes putting out his own money 
(impliedly with no recompense) to help Khalluf, saying, “I had to pay these 170 dinars from my own 
resources, in order not to detain what is yours.” Id. Eventually these men turned to the legal system to 
resolve their differences. However, it is notable that Khalluf was so concerned about his reputation with 
Yeshua, who was a much smaller merchant and who, it seems, did not want to do any further business 
with him in the future. Yet looking at Yeshua’s connections Khalluf’s fear appears to be well-grounded 
since Yeshua was in a good position to widely spread negative word about him through the major trading 
centers. 
 The final letter is from the son of Ibn Awkal’s long-time agent in Tunisia to a former apprentice and 
trading partner of his. However, it is not a good example of purely private multilateral reputation 
sanctioning for breach of a suhba relationship. First, it is unclear whether this was a dispute over a suhba 
or the estate of the writer’s father. See GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter #18; see also Edwards 
& Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 429. Second, the dispute was not purely private. A local merchant was 
appointed as power of attorney to bring an “action” against the writer, and the person receiving the letter 
of appointment “showed it to everyone,” after which “the people became agitated and hostile to [me].” 
Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 429 (internal quotation marks omitted). In an effort to rehabilitate 
his reputation, the writer turns to a former partner in Fustat for help salvaging his reputation. He begs his 
former partner to “mind our friendship and the education given to you by me, and the bread and salt we 
have eaten together . . . . [B]e my proxy everywhere and reply to every detail [of the allegations against 
me] in this letter.” GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter #18.  
 In sum, the letters adduced by Greif as evidence of a traders’ coalition all relate to larger or quite 
central merchants imposing or being asked to counter reputational harm. And, as Edwards and Ogilvie 
suggest, none of these letters (nor any of the others in the English language corpus) show that misdeeds 
were punished by complete exclusion from the trade. In addition, if the Maghribi were a horizontally 
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Together these considerations suggest that caution must be used in 
abstracting from the governance of the transactions reflected in the Geniza 
documents to those that were not—such as transactions between a small 
merchant in Palermo and a small merchant in Tunisia. 
II. SMALL-WORLD NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
The fragmentary nature of the historical record does not permit the 
construction of a complete sociogram mapping of all of the ties among the 
Maghribi traders and trading centers. It is therefore impossible to 
conclusively establish that the Maghribi network had small-world structure. 
But the evidence presented above, together with the fact that the core 
conditions that theorists associate with the emergence of small-world 
networks were present across the Maghribis’ trading area, suggests that the 
small-world form is likely to at least closely approximate the overall pattern 
of ties across the trading area. 
Models of network formation suggest that small worlds are most likely 
to form when (1) the cost of dealing with someone close to you is far lower 
than the cost of dealing with someone far away and (2) the returns to dealing 
with transactors in distant places are high enough to induce some transactors 
do so.181 When these conditions are present—as they were across the 
Maghribi trading area182—the models suggest that “[a] limited number” of 
 
structured group as Greif claims, see supra note 40, it is curious that all of the examples he uses to show 
the coalition’s ability to ostracize traders who misbehaved involve these large or central traders. 
 181 For the formal model of small-world networks that rests on these “fundamental intuitions,” see 
Matthew O. Jackson & Brian W. Rogers, The Economics of Small Worlds, 3 J. EUROPEAN ECON. ASS’N 
617, 619 (2005) (setting forth a model of network formation where “agents are grouped on ‘islands’, and 
costs of connection are relatively low within an island and relatively high across islands,” and showing 
how “[t]his cost structure, together with the indirect benefits structure of the connections model,” which 
takes into account both the direct benefits of across-island trade as well as the indirect benefits an agent 
gets from having access to his distant trading partner’s connections, can together “generate[] . . . small-
world characteristics”). The indirect benefits assumption of the model is met in the Maghribi context 
because merchants in a suhba knew that “[t]he same services [as they might ask one another to provide], 
albeit to a lesser degree, were expected to be done for friends of business friends.” 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, 
supra note 41, at 166. For a discussion of other sets of conditions that might give rise to small-world 
networks, see Joel A. C. Baum et al., Where Do Small Worlds Come From?, 12  INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 
697, 697–98 (2003). 
 182 As discussed above, text accompanying notes 41–59, trading within a local market was 
inexpensive given the clique-like structure of ties that enabled information to circulate as the near costless 
by-product of everyday interactions. There are also many aspects of the trade which suggest that the 
returns to cross-market trade were high. During this period, oversees connections were valuable. Among 
other things, they opened up new markets for local commodities, gave traders access to products not 
available in their local market, and enabled those with contacts in other trading centers to take advantage 
of the widely different prices prevailing in different markets. See GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at 83 
(noting that “[d]espite the dangers and difficulties, goods were sent on to countries where they might 
obtain a better price”); see also SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #143 (noting the wide differential 
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people will decide to trade across locations,183 creating a classic small-world 
structure. As noted above, a small-world structure is one where the number 
of cross-cluster links are small relative to the size of the entire network,184 
yet are structured in such a way that the ties they create dramatically reduce 
the number of steps that most traders would have had to go through to learn 
about market conditions and the reputation of merchants in other trading 
centers. In markets with a small-world structure information can flow (or be 
obtained) efficiently185 enough to make reputation a potentially powerful 
way to support exchange.186 As one network theorist observed, small-world 
structures are able to achieve “great efficiency in moving information, 
innovations, routines, experience, and other resources that enable 
organizational learning, adaptation and competitive advantage.”187 
Although the contract governance forces generated by the trading area’s 
small-world network structure might well have been sufficient to bond trade, 
there were other structural features of the Maghribi market that together with 
common transactional practices further strengthened the governance power 
of its small-world form and likely played a role in enhancing the ability of 
network governance-based private order to adequately bond most of the 
Maghribis’ commercial undertakings. 
 
in the price of pepper between Sfax and Sicily); id. at Letter #148 (where an agent of Ibn Awkal’s in 
Tunisia notes that he had heard the price of flax was far higher in Sicily). 
 183 Jackson & Rogers, supra note 181, at 619. The theorists do not explain why, apart from the cost 
involved in establishing ties, the number of them is likely to be limited. However, an explanation emerges 
once it is recognized the merchants who were able to forge overseas connections were network brokers, 
see supra note 152 (defining a network broker and discussing their ability to move sticky information 
between markets), who were likely to earn higher returns than otherwise similarly situated traders who 
lacked overseas connections. See BURT, supra note 32 (giving multiple examples of the superior returns 
earned by network brokers). However, there is a limit to how many would-be brokers will choose to make 
these connections. Although the cost of making these connections remains relatively constant (after 
perhaps declining a bit initially), after a certain number of connections are established, the benefit to the 
next additional trader of entering the market will no longer outweigh the cost of doing so. This suggests 
that small-world networks may be a reasonably stable form of market organization. 
 184 See Baum et al., supra note 181, at 698 (“Despite a low overall density of ties, as a result of the[] 
clique-spanning ties, actors in a [small-world] network are linked with each other through a relatively 
small number of intermediaries.”). A defining feature of small-world networks is that they have small 
diameters. The diameter of a network is “the largest distance between any two nodes in the network.” 
JACKSON, supra note 155, at 32. 
 185 See Allen Wilhite, Bilateral Trading and ‘Small-World’ Networks, 18 COMPUTATIONAL ECON. 
49 (2001) (using market simulations based on “an agent-based computational approach” to demonstrate 
that “a hybrid model in which most agents trade locally but a few agents trade globally results in an 
economy that quickly reaches a Pareto optimal equilibrium with significantly lower search and 
negotiation costs” than other networks structures studied). 
 186 For example, a trader in Tunisia who wanted to know about a trader in Fustat could have gone to 
a Taherti, who could have gone to Nahray, who would likely have been able to provide the information. 
 187 Baum et al., supra note 181, at 697–98. 
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A. Two-Tiered Market-Wide Governance 
The small-world configuration of ties among the Maghribi traders and 
trading centers had a key structural feature that enhanced its governance 
force: namely, the existence of one or two central information nodes in each 
trading center. These nodes would have made it possible for most traders to 
learn about the reputation of a trader in another center by going through only 
one or two well-known and easily identified intermediaries—thereby 
making the market as a whole semi-closed,188 and the force of reputation-
based network governance potentially quite strong. 
This type of two-tiered market structure, where “[a] small upper-level 
group of sub-market monitors arranges [or is known to be able to arrange] 
communication of the news of any cheating in one sub-market to all other 
sub-markets”189—something the large traders or Merchants’ Representatives 
in each of the major trading centers could easily have done—would have 
enhanced the flow of reputation-related information and with it the network’s 
governance force. This type of structure also has the advantage of making it 
possible to determine whether a trader has misbehaved using the “better 
information available [locally],”190 something both the Merchants’ 
Representatives and larger merchants had the ability and incentive to do. 
This market structure has been shown (in theory) to be a more efficient 
governance structure than a clique or a coalition, particularly as the number 
of traders in a market or the distance between them increases.191 It enables 
private ordering to work on a scale and over distances that are not possible 
 
 188 The small-world network form is itself semi-closed, yet the existence of the central information 
nodes in each cluster whose identity was known to all would have increased the closure of the network 
by increasing the accuracy of information and the speed with which both market and reputation-related 
information could circulate. 
 189 Avinash Dixit, Two-Tier Market Institutions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 139, 139 (2004) (introducing and 
modeling the two-tier market structure). 
 190 Id. at 143. 
 191 Id. at 140 (“[T]he punishment [of a cheater] is a public good, and its execution is another dilemma 
game. Theoretical models solve this dilemma by postulating punishments for refusing to participate in 
punishments of the cheater, ad infinitum, but that is a somewhat unsatisfactory solution.”). 
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when governance is clique-based192 and depends on all reputation-relevant 
information diffusing throughout the clique.193 
The two-tiered system might also be superior to some types of third-
party adjudication systems—even those with the ability to enforce 
judgments—if the accuracy of the information it uses to determine whether 
a person has acted improperly is significantly better (and known to be better) 
than the information used by the third party. This condition may well have 
obtained in the Maghribi context. The information directly observed by 
either large merchants or Merchants’ Representatives (which determined the 
imposition or non-imposition of reputational harm in the network) might 
have been more accurate than the information that could have been submitted 
to a court in either the Jewish or Muslim legal systems, where witnesses 
would often have been unavailable, evidence might have been located far 
away, and extensive delays were common.194 
B. Micro-Network Governance 
Network governance among the Maghribi traders may also have been 
strengthened by three other features of the market that would have enabled 
local networks and patterns of connections among small subgroups of traders 
to have greatly contributed to the support of trade. Recent network studies 
have shown that the configuration of ties among even very small 
subnetworks of traders can have a potentially powerful effect on contract 
governance.195 
 
 192 Id. For articles suggesting that there are limits to the size of the group that can be governed by 
clique governance, see Robert Cooter & Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of 
Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 15 (1984) (discussing the connection 
between group size, informal contract enforcement, and options for formal enforcement), and Avinash 
Dixit, Trade Expansion and Contract Enforcement, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1293, 1294 (2003) (“Self-
enforcing ‘relation-based’ groups face rising marginal costs: members added at the margin are almost by 
definition less well connected, making it harder to communicate information with them and to ensure 
their participation in any punishments.”). 
 193 See Email from Avinash Dixit, Professor of Econ. Emeritus, Princeton Univ., to author (July 27, 
2018) (on file with Northwestern University Law Review) (The “costs of detecting and proving 
misbehavior, and communicating the information about verdicts and punishments (who, what etc) to all 
traders . . . need not differ between Mr. Big [a local information node] and Greif’s coalition; if anything 
they may be lower for Mr. Big. So Greif’s coalition covering the whole market (the full circle in [the] 
model) can’t be any more efficient than one Mr. Big governing the whole. And my model proves that 
(under the condition of equation (5) which says that the size of the circle C and the density of traders D 
per unit distance along it are not too small), a single Mr. Big is not as efficient as the two-tier system of 
several local Mr. Bigs. (Of course if the whole market DC is small, one Mr. Big may suffice.”). 
 194 See, e.g., Greif, Early Trade, supra note 1, at 529 (discussing the practical limitations of accessing 
the legal system, primarily delay and the spoliation of evidence). 
 195 See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in 
Vietnam, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 637 (1999); John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Interfirm 
Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1285 (1999); John McMillan & 
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The first feature of the market that might have strengthened market-
wide network governance is the fact that two-thirds of the suhbas between 
pairs of traders were accompanied by one or more partnerships (that were 
sometimes, at least in theory, legally enforceable196) between the traders.197 
Cheating in the suhba might have destabilized these partnerships, or led 
either or both of the partners to incur increased monitoring costs, creating 
the possibility of monetary losses far in excess of the suhba amount.198 The 
broad discretion granted to partners under some forms of partnership199 might 
also have opened the door to a variety of types of retaliation short of 
termination, many quite difficult to detect, thereby increasing the cost of any 
misbehavior and providing a strong deterrent to engaging it.200 
Some of the partnerships entered into by merchants with suhbas 
included a third trader as an additional partner.201 The governance force 
 
Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional Public Order, 98 U. MICH. L. REV. 2421 
(2000) (documenting the powerful governance effects of small networks in transactions between 
manufacturers and their buyers and suppliers in Vietnam at a time when the legal system was unable to 
support exchange); see also Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 157, at 608–09 
(describing how Harley Davidson uses a supplier council to create network ties among its top cadre of 
strategic suppliers that enables it to more credibly commit not to misbehave toward any one of them). 
 196 The proportion of Maghribi partnerships that were even nominally legally enforceable within 
either the Jewish or Muslim legal systems is a matter of debate among historians. For an overview of 
opinions, see ACKERMAN-LIEBERMAN, supra note 166. 
 197 Goitein, Crusades, supra note 69, at 59 (“Merchants connected with one another by informal 
cooperation [suhba] normally also concluded, year in year out, formal partnerships in several specific 
undertakings. Partnerships of different types and facets were the legal instruments for formal 
cooperation.”). For a more detailed discussion of this practice, see ACKERMAN-LIEBERMAN, supra note 
166, at 86–90. For examples of such partnerships, see GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at Letter #16 
(revealing that two traders with a suhba also had a partnership), and id. at Letter #14 (where the author 
writes to Awkal about their suhba as well as a partnership between them, and two additional partnerships 
each with a different third partner). 
 198 As noted above, agents became anxious when they incurred a loss in a suhba when acting on 
behalf of a large merchant with whom they also had a partnership, so much so that they sometimes 
transferred some personal assets to the partnership to help make up for the loss. See supra text 
accompanying notes 160–164. 
 199 See ACKERMAN-LIEBERMAN, supra note 166, at 103–21 (discussing discretion in partnerships 
and noting that “Geniza documents reveal partners to have granted one another varying degrees of 
discretion”). 
 200 For a model suggesting that transactors who are linked in more than one market, or by additional 
contracts, may under certain conditions (most notably different/asymmetric costs of defection in each 
relationship or contract) have more stable cooperative relations than those who are linked only in one 
such relationship, see B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive 
Behavior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1 (1990). The intuition is that if breach is overdeterred in one market and 
underdeterred in another, when the two markets are linked so that breach in one leads to breakdown of 
the relationship in the other, breach in both markets can sometimes be deterred, making cooperation more 
likely. Id. 
 201 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 167 (“More often than not, informal cooperation was 
accompanied by one or more partnerships concluded between the correspondents, frequently with 
additional partners.”). Udovitch notes these three-way partnerships were often the way that a new 
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created by the existence of trilateral partnerships would also have been 
potentially quite powerful. Even if the suhba agent thought that any misdeeds 
would not become widely known, the existence of the trilateral partnership 
put at risk the potential loss of two trading partners, thereby increasing the 
cost of any misbehavior.202 Interestingly, one empirical study of the way that 
the existence of these triangular sets of connections (dubbed “supported 
relationships”) contributed to performance of reciprocal favor obligations 
found that triangular ties among market participants contributed more to the 
support of informal reciprocal obligations than did the overall density of the 
connections among participants in the relevant market.203 
A second aspect of the market that might have indirectly strengthened 
network governance is the fact that suhbas had to be established face-to-
face.204 Given the time, expense, and difficulty of travel during this period, 
forming new suhba relationships would have been very costly. 
Consequently, even if a trader thought that any information about 
 
merchant was first included in a trusting subnetwork. See Avrom L. Udovitch, Formalism and 
Informalism in the Social and Economic Institutions of the Medieval Islamic World, in INDIVIDUALISM 
AND CONFORMITY IN CLASSICAL ISLAM 61 (Amin Banani & Speros Vryonis Jr. eds., 1977) [hereinafter 
Udovitch, Formalism]. 
 202 See, e.g., Baum, Shipilov & Rowley, supra note 181, at 701 (expressing the widely accepted view 
that “[t]hird-party ties can also promote good behavior by fostering a concern for local reputation, and 
reducing each individual member’s power . . . [so that a] member of such a triad is thus less free, less 
independent, and more constrained than a member of a dyadic relationship, and as a result, triadic ties 
tend to be more stable and durable than dyadic ties” (citations omitted)). However, while having 
additional mutual partners in a dense network might encourage better behavior, several recent theoretical 
studies show that the effect may be at least partly context- and norm-dependent. One study of these 
triangular sets of connections (dubbed “supported relationships”) suggested that high density would 
enable punishments to cascade through the network, leading to networks that optimally feature low 
density but still a high fraction of supported relationships. See Matthew O. Jackson et al., Social Capital 
and Social Quilts: Network Patterns of Favor Exchange, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 1857 (2012) [hereinafter 
Jackson et al., Social Quilts]. Another study shows that with triangular sets of connections, relatively 
simple punishment behavior can deter cheating, whereas using more complex sets of connections raises 
problematic incentives for traders who have not deviated to circulate misleading information about who 
has deviated. See David A. Miller & Xu Tan, Seeking Relationship Support: Strategic Network Formation 
and Robust Cooperation (June 14, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Northwestern University 
Law Review); see also Ali & Miller, supra note 53 (modeling a similar structure but in a context where 
the third party would only learn of the breach if the breached-against suhba party informed him of it, a 
context where stability might not be added if the punishment for breach is permanent exclusion, because 
in such a situation the breached-against party could sometimes do better by not revealing the harm he 
suffered). 
 203 See Jackson et al., Social Quilts, supra note 202, at 1858–59 (introducing the network structure 
known as the social quilt and showing how, under certain information transmission assumptions, 
individuals exchanging favors who “have common friends” are more likely to perform than those who do 
not; noting that the presence of these third party ties (called “support”) can be a better predictor of 
performance than the overall density of ties in the relevant market; and providing empirical support based 
on a study of reciprocal favors in rural Indian villages). 
 204 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 17. 
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wrongdoing would only spread to those with whom he had prior or current 
suhbas and partnerships, the anticipated damage to his ability to trade might 
have been significant enough to induce him to behave well (even in his 
largest undertakings) given the costs and difficulties he would face if he had 
to create an entirely new personal network after being excluded from his 
existing network. 
Most merchants established their initial core set of trading relationships 
during their apprenticeship years, while traveling on behalf of their mentors. 
“[Y]oung merchants traveled to increase their knowledge of people and 
places, building up their jāh”205 along the way. They also learned about the 
acumen and trustworthiness of many traders by observing how they behaved 
toward their mentor and others. Conversely, the behavior of younger and 
apprenticed traders tended to be watched closely by senior merchants, often 
at the request of their mentor or relatives.206 These aspects of apprenticeship 
enabled young traders to establish an initial set of ties at a modest cost.207 
The cost to a merchant of creating a new personal network mid-career would 
have been much higher than the cost of building his original network in his 
youth. A mid-career merchant who was excluded from his prior personal 
network who set out to establish an equivalent network (even if only with 
the fifty-odd traders a typical merchant dealt with at one time)208 and thereby 
reestablish his jah would face years of travel and extraordinary expense. 
Unlike a young new merchant finishing an apprenticeship who had a network 
of contacts when he began trading on his own account (and thus had at least 
some jah), a merchant attempting to build a new network from scratch would 
initially have had little or no jah to trade. He would therefore have had to 
undertake particularly time-consuming and labor-intensive activities to 
induce anyone to trade with him, further increasing the cost of rebuilding his 
trading network. These considerations suggest that if a trader were to be 
excluded from his existing (ego) network, the cost to him of establishing a 
new network and building up his jah would have been extraordinarily high.209 
 
 205 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 249. 
 206 See, e.g., SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #46 (where Awkal’s nephew asks Awkal to “keep 
an eye” on his son Joseph). 
 207 See GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 136 & n.67, 275 (noting that 
during their apprenticeships “young merchants were encouraged to form associations and partnerships 
with their peers,” which created “the relationships that would be the foundation of [their] career”; it also 
gave them the opportunity to “develop [their] ties both with players in the great Mediterranean 
metropolises and with a particular region”). 
 208 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 11. 
 209 An important advantage of creating one’s network connections during one’s apprenticeship years 
while trading on a mentor’s account is that when a young merchant enters the market, he does so with a 
decent amount of jah, that is, a reasonably developed set of connections. If a trader had to build up 
connections while attempting to operate as an independent and full-fledged merchant rather than an 
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A trader attempting to create an entirely new network of trading 
relationships would also have faced two additional hurdles that might have 
made market reentry difficult or impossible. First, unless the misbehaving 
merchant was previously known as one of the subset of traders who were 
widely known to regularly commute between trading centers,210 a sudden 
spurt of travel from a middle-aged and previously sedentary merchant might 
have been taken as a negative reputation signal, as traders tended to limit 
their travel as they aged. Second, traders typically required positive 
references before dealing with a new trader,211 something that a trader 
excluded from his own trading network would have been hard-pressed to 
obtain. 
The final consideration that might have strengthened network 
governance is that in certain types of relationships, the force of bilateral 
sanctions could have been quite significant. Consider a small trader acting 
on behalf of one of the largest overseas traders. Even if the only sanction for 
the small trader’s misbehavior was the loss of this one trading relationship, 
given the jah of the largest traders, and the small size of the average 
transaction, it is unlikely that an agent could make more money by breaching 
than he would gain from maintaining his access to his largest trading 
partners’ jah in the future.212 It is therefore plausible that at least the largest 
traders could have relied on bilateral governance mechanisms to induce 
many of their agents to behave properly.213 
In sum, these micro governance mechanisms combined with the overall 
force of small-world network governance and strengthened by the two-tier 
structure of information transfer that characterized the market, might well 
have been powerful enough to permit the Maghribi traders to transact across 
the Muslim Mediterranean with little, if any, reliance on the public legal 
 
apprentice, it would likely take a long time, as he would have very little to offer counterparties beyond 
hard work, which would slow down his ability to form connections. 
 210 Goitein, Crusades, supra note 69, at 56 (observing that some traders were well-known commuters 
between various locations). 
 211 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 133 (“Geniza merchants expanded their 
networks principally through travel” and through formal letters of introduction, but the recommendations 
in these letters were not taken at face value, additional inquiries were made, and “merchants made their 
own judgments.”). 
 212 Alternatively, a small trader who cheated a large overseas trader might have found himself 
excluded from the major trading centers given the close ties among the largest merchants in each center. 
Even if he was able to continue in business, his activities would have been limited to more peripheral, 
and presumably less profitable, places. 
 213 Geniza historian Abraham Udovitch thought that suhba ties were supported through bilateral 
governance mechanisms and genuine interpersonal trust that build up over years. See ACKERMAN-
LIEBERMAN, supra note 166, at 160–61 (presenting Udovitch’s views of suhba governance). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1050 
system and without any coalition of traders with a collectivist identity having 
existed. 
III. REVISITING THE DEBATE OVER PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC ORDER 
The discussion presented above suggests that private order could have 
supported trade among the Maghribi traders; yet whether public or private 
order standing alone was in fact the dominant way of supporting exchange 
is likely to remain a matter of debate among historians. While the Geniza 
documents reveal that the Maghribi sometimes went to court,214 it is 
impossible to estimate the rate at which they did so. Yet over the past years, 
historians, responding in large part to Greif’s suggestion that a Maghribi 
traders’ coalition governed exchange, have pointed to a number of 
considerations that in their view indirectly suggest that private ordering 
would have been unable to support trade and that the legal system must have 
played a central role governing exchange. 
The historians make three core arguments.215 First, they argue that “[t]he 
trouble which Geniza merchants took to guarantee their activities legally is 
good evidence that they must have thought the protections of the legal system 
worth securing,”216 for such practices cannot be “fitted into a theory of 
effective private-order enforcement.”217 Second, and relatedly, they suggest 
that multilateral reputation-based private ordering could not have been the 
primary way of supporting exchange because the types of information that 
would have had to flow across the region for it to do so—such as discussions 
of honesty, probity, and malfeasance—were not commonly mentioned in 
merchant letters, and the information that was communicated did not have 
the indicia of accuracy needed for reputation-based trade to flourish. And, 
finally, they point out that because the Maghribi did business with Muslims 
they must have had ways other than an intra-Maghribi system of private 
 
 214 See Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 421 (“The Maghribi traders made use of the formal legal 
system in order to enforce agency agreements in long-distance trade.”); Goldberg, Business 
Relationships, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that legal action is mentioned in 5% of the Geniza letters). 
However, Greif emphasizes that while the legal system may have been used on occasion it is important 
to note that many references to the legal system in the Geniza corpus do not relate to contract enforcement 
but rather to issues dealing with the estates of deceased merchants. 
 215 The historians make additional arguments against Greif’s claim that a traders’ coalition existed, 
first among them that there is no empirical evidence that it did. For the wide range of arguments they 
make on this core question and Greif’s pointed replies, see sources cited supra note 10. 
 216 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 29–30. 
 217 Id. at 25; see also Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 157 (describing the detailed 
contracts entered into by original equipment manufacturers and their suppliers and exploring how these 
contracts are used to keep the law out of these relationships and make network governance a more 
important force). 
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order to support these and other long-distance trades, such as reliance on the 
Islamic legal system. 
In the absence of new documentary evidence, the relative role of private 
ordering and public law in the Maghribi trade will never be known. However, 
in thinking about the implications of the Maghribi case for institutional 
design and for how public and private order can work in tandem to support 
trade, it is useful to explore how the core aspects of the Maghribi trade that 
historians associate with public order might also have enhanced private 
order. 
A. Formalities 
Historians maintain that “systematic testimony to the Geniza 
merchants’ attachment to the legal system” can be found in the extent to 
which they “organized their activities in accordance with legal norms and 
forms.”218 Traders conducted much of their business in front of witnesses, 
and also made use of “clerks and notaries” who were “on hand to register 
transactions, agreements and terms.”219 These functionaries also “wrote up 
contracts” and “noted the state, nature and labelling of shipments that were 
opened.”220 And, when traders entered into partnerships, they evidenced a 
preference for written over unwritten partnership agreements,221 used 
common legal forms,222 and were attentive to “secur[ing] the formal 
quittances that ended each partnership.”223 In the historian’s view, these 
practices cannot be “fitted into a theory of effective private-order 
enforcement.”224 
These practices might have indicated a desire to rely on the law, or at 
least preserve the option to do so; yet they are equally consistent with a desire 
to rely on extralegal contract governance.225 Each of them could have both 
 
 218 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 156. 
 219 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 27. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 27–28. 
 222 Interestingly, while merchants tended to formally use one of the standard forms of partnership 
when entering into these relationships, “[t]he jargon of merchants in their letters . . . shows that they made 
different distinctions between partnerships than those found in legal treatises or even in their own written 
contracts.” Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 14. This suggests that legal formalities 
might have been playing a channeling function rather than a strictly governing function in these 
relationships. See Lon Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941) (discussing the 
evidentiary, channeling, and cautionary functions of formality). 
 223 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 157. 
 224 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 25; see also Bernstein, Beyond Relational 
Contracts, supra note 157 (describing a context where legal practices support informal exchange). 
 225 Contemporary systems of private contractual ordering, like the private legal system created and 
run by the National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA), see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a 
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improved the stability of bilateral trading relationships226 and made network 
governance more powerful. The reason is simple: one of the main roles of a 
written agreement is to “scaffold” the effectiveness of extralegal governance 
forces by creating a common understanding between the parties or across the 
market as a whole about what behavior constitutes cooperation 
(performance) or noncooperation (breach).227 
In bilateral trading relationships, the common understanding of 
obligation furthered by use of legal forms makes contracting relationships 
easier and cheaper to establish. Along with the use of notaries and registries 
that provide additional documentation of agreements, the use of legally 
recognized forms also makes these relationships less likely to break down 
over a misunderstanding about what was agreed to. In addition, the use of 
 
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 PA. L. REV. 1765, 
1771–77 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law] (providing an overview of the operation of the 
system), authorize transactors to rely on the services of various types of government or government-
authorized functionaries, like licensed weighers and inspectors. See, e.g., NGFA Grain Trade Rules, R. 
14, at 10 (Mar. 20, 2018) (“Weights”) (permitting the parties to designate all weights to be Official Class 
X weights, that is, weights where “weighing is 100 percent supervised by [government] licensed official 
personnel,” or Class Y weights that are provided by grain elevators whose processes have been certified 
by the government). The use of these public or publicly licensed functionaries to make these 
determinations no more transforms this private system into a public one than does the Maghribis’ use of 
registries or the services of other “government authorities,” and it belies the historians’ claim that the use 
of such functionaries cannot be “fitted into a theory of effective private-order enforcement.” Goldberg, 
Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 25. 
 226 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through 
Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1751–52 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Cotton] 
(exploring the role of common knowledge in increasing the stability of bilateral cooperative contractual 
relationships). By clarifying and sometimes standardizing the contours of obligations, formalities of 
various sorts make it clear to transactors when they are bound and what actions will count as cooperation 
and what actions will be understood as defection. This clarity reduces the likelihood that bilateral 
cooperative relationships once established will break down. Id. at 1752–53 (“Over time, cotton 
institutions . . . created formal methods for transmitting reputation information . . . . [D]espite the creation 
of these formal and informal information intermediaries, social trust-based reputation sanctions remained 
important.”). 
 227 Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal 
Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 981, 988 (arguing that “[f]ormal contracting 
provides essential scaffolding to support the beliefs and strategies that make informal means of 
enforcement such as reputation and the threat of termination effective,” and noting that in general the role 
of contractual formalities in ensuring legal enforceability and their role in facilitating extralegal 
governance are “currently conflated in the relational contracting literature”). For additional empirical 
support, see generally Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 226 (describing the rules, norms, and institutions in 
the American cotton industry that support largely extralegal cooperative contracting relationships); 
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 225; and Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 157 
(discussing the extremely long contracts used by American Rust Belt original equipment manufacturers 
procuring component parts from suppliers). 
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witnesses reduces the likelihood of disagreement about what in fact was 
done.228 
Using widely known legal forms can also enhance the functioning of a 
system of multilateral reputation-based trade, especially where sanctions are 
simply the cumulative effect of individual traders deciding that it is not in 
their own self-interest to deal with a wrongdoer. In these contexts, the 
success of any multilateral sanctioning system “depends on a common 
cognitive system that ascribes meaning to various actions, particularly 
actions that constitute cheating.”229 If the traders had a sound understanding 
of the legal forms and transactional requirements of Jewish and/or Islamic 
law, these forms and requirements would have provided just the type of 
common understanding (or the focal point for common understanding230) 
needed for network governance to have been a powerful force. These 
benefits, while in some sense arising from the legal system’s existence, were 
independent of any ability or inclination the traders did or did not have to 
enforce these obligations in court. 
 Similarly, while witnesses would have been useful if a trader wanted 
to sue in either the Jewish or Islamic legal systems, traders had numerous 
other reasons to have their transactions witnessed. The information witnesses 
 
 228 For a discussion of the lengths large companies go to ensure their suppliers understand their 
contractual obligations, see Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 157. 
 229 GREIF, PATH, supra note 3, at 69. Greif suggests that for subjects not dealt with explicitly in 
contracts or merchant letters, much of the common understanding needed for this system of trade was 
provided by a “merchants’ law.” See GREIF, PATH, supra note 3, at 59, 70 (noting that the merchants’ 
law took the form of a social norm-based “code of conduct” that “specified how agents needed to act to 
be considered honest in circumstances not mentioned in the merchant’s instructions . . . . [It] served as a 
default contract”). However, Greif does not provide evidence or examples of this merchants’ law, a 
concept long invoked to explain the success of long-distance trade in Europe during the Middle Ages, 
that has recently been substantially discredited. See Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern 
Lex Mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 37 (2004); Emily 
Kadens, The Medieval Law Merchant: Tyranny of a Construct, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 251 (2015); Emily 
Kadens, The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1177 (2012). Although 
Goldberg does not posit the existence of such an extensive law merchant, she notes that in most of the 
legally recognized forms of partnership and reciprocal agency, “merchant terminology also reveals that 
each relationship had norms and expectations that went beyond the law.” Goldberg, Business 
Relationships, supra note 1, at 22; Phillip I. Ackerman-Lieberman, Commercial Forms and Legal Norms 
in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt, 30 L. & HIST. REV. 1007, 1111 (2012) (suggesting that 
contrary to the claims of Greif and Udovitch there was “complex dialogue between canonized legal norms 
and commercial practice,” making a blend of Jewish law and Jewish law-influenced merchant practice 
the source of commonly understood obligations among the Maghribi traders rather than Islamic law or a 
general law merchant). 
 230 Moreover, given this common understanding of what people were obligated to do, transmitting 
information about what they did in fact do, would, in many instances, have given the recipient the requisite 
information about a transactor’s probity without any need to mention it explicitly. In addition, such clarity 
would also have improved bilateral relationships by reducing the likelihood that they would break down 
over a misunderstanding of what was to be done. 
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provided in their letters enabled traders to monitor231 their agents and agents 
to credibly communicate information to their principals.232 It also made it 
possible for traders to triangulate information essential to their business 
operations. Traders also used witnesses to make their representations to their 
partners and agents more credible. In one letter, a trader who had a 
problematic relationship with one of his partners sought to convince him that 
he had acted properly explaining that “I showed people your letter and the 
merchandise you had with me . . . [and when I turned some of the goods over 
to X to sell on your behalf] I took out all your goods in the presence of a 
group of our men, and handed them to [X] to sell them for you.”233 Similarly, 
when relationships between a merchant and an agent got rocky, agents could 
continue to trade with their principal while reestablishing their 
trustworthiness by having their activities witnessed by others willing to write 
to their principals confirming the propriety of their activity. Relationships 
would, as a result, become less brittle and easier to preserve.234 
There are also several aspects of the Maghribis’ preferences among 
different forms of contract/partnership, as well as an aspect of their letter-
writing conventions, that suggest that they did not view the legal instrument 
they selected or the law as the primary source of incentives for securing the 
performance they sought. First, they preferred to use suhbas rather than other 
types of labor contracts, despite the fact that “[b]oth Islamic and Jewish law 
would only recognize labor contracts with monetary compensation: a portion 
of the profits, payments by the piece, or a daily wage.”235 Second, “Geniza 
merchants seem to have preferred contracts [of particular forms] in opposite 
proportion to the agent’s natural incentive [based on the contract’s 
provisions] to provide good service.”236 Third, while the merchants did show 
 
 231 For an example of witnesses playing this monitoring role, see SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at 
Letter #87 (describing a situation in which a Fustat-based trader having trouble with an agent in North 
Africa asked one of his partners in the agent’s location to “[u]rge him on and report on him in all your 
letters.” The same trader also complained that his partner had failed to keep him updated on the actions 
of another trader who owed him money, saying “I have no doubt that you often receive letters from him, 
but you fail to write to me and do not mention his affairs. . . . Urge him to send me my due. Put pressure 
on him . . . .”); see also id. at Letter #97 (asking Nahray to inform another trader that “throughout the 
winter I [the author] have been watching over Abū Ibrahīm . . . in regard to the sale and purchase of cloth 
and other goods, which he undertook. He is trying hard and is trying to please . . . and always behaves 
well. He is much better than the others”). 
 232 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 121 (describing an agent who received 
a letter complaining about his behavior in not selling goods and who responded by bringing witnesses to 
the warehouse with the principal’s goods to show them that the goods were not salable). 
 233 SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #91. 
 234 See supra note 160 (describing how a trader obtained witness statements about a flax transaction 
and shipped them with the bales since he thought that Ibn Awkal did not fully trust him). 
 235 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 154. 
 236 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 23. 
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a preference for written over unwritten partnership agreements, and this 
preference might have indicated a desire to rely on the legal system for 
enforcement, it is notable that among the written partnerships in the Geniza 
corpus, about a third include provisions making the core obligations among 
partners legally unenforceable.237 Merchants’ preferences for written 
agreements might also be partially explained by the need to keep track of the 
partners’ respective responsibilities in a market where the typical trader had 
fifty deals going simultaneously.238 Finally, the way the Maghribis dated 
their letters suggests that they might have taken deliberate steps to keep the 
law and its shadow at bay. Letters were only admissible as evidence in court 
if they were dated and included the year. Although most letters contained a 
day and month, they typically omitted the year, which suggests that they 
were specifically intended not to be evidence in court.239 Together, these 
considerations suggest that the shadow of legal enforcement was not likely 
to have been viewed as the main force creating incentives for performance 
or nonperformance of commercial obligations.240 
 
 237 See Avner Greif, Contract Enforcement and Institutions Among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting 
Edwards and Ogilvie 10–11 (Ctr. for Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 2350, 2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1159681 [https://perma.cc/UJ27-LQKP] [hereinafter, Greif, Enforcement] (“In 
one third of the (long-distance trade) partnerships, a partner(s) relinquished the right to legally challenge 
the partner who would serve as an agent. . . . [This] is consistent with the view that reputation-based 
enforcement prevailed . . . .”). 
 238 One historian points to a practice that she characterizes as indicating a desire to rely, at least in 
part, on Muslim courts to enforce contracts, namely that traders often “secured such protection [from the 
Muslim courts] by drawing up the contract before a Muslim and a Jewish notary.” Goldberg, Business 
Relationships, supra note 1, at 28 (citing 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 179, 87–89). Neither of 
these page cites substantiates the claim, although a search of the index turns up references to Muslim and 
Jewish notaries both being used to notarize a certain subset of debt obligations, not partnerships or other 
types of commercial agency or exchange. See 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 251–52. Goitein 
explains the practice (which he notes was infrequently used in the eleventh century but became quite 
common in the twelfth), as being beneficial as it was needed to make the debt as widely negotiable as 
possible, something that was critical in an economy where cash was in short supply and credit central to 
exchange. 
 239 See GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 68–69 (“Writers of commercial 
correspondence generally dated their letters, . . . but never with the year as was required in documents 
that formed part of the legal record,” they also appeared not to keep them in their files). Goldberg also 
notes that “[b]oth Islamic and Jewish law would only recognize labor contracts with monetary 
compensation,” the “very kinds of payments the suhba was meant to avoid.” Id. at 154. If the Maghribi 
viewed the legal system as providing important support for their exchanges, their preference for suhba 
over enforceable labor contracts is difficult to explain. 
 240 Under the most popular transactional form, the suhba, the agent had “had no natural incentive to 
get the best deal on any individual transaction . . . since he would get no commission,” only reciprocal 
services. And, as for partnership, in the more popular of the two types of partnership (joint-active) the 
“agent had a natural stake in each deal, for he would get a percentage of the profits” and would have to 
do less every time he shifted work to the other active partner, whereas it was only in the “least popular” 
form of relationship, the “sleeping-active partnership,” that “the agent had an uncomplicated and strong 
incentive to put forth his best efforts.” Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 23; see also 
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In sum, recognizing the important role that formalities can play in 
systems of reputation-based relational contracting241 suggests that the many 
formal and legally defined practices followed by the Maghribi traders that 
some historians interpret as evidence that the Maghribi relied heavily on the 
legal system are, in fact, equally consistent with reliance on extralegally 
governed trade. Indeed, such practices may play an even more important role 
in systems of private ordering than they do in systems of public order, where 
more extensive factfinding can take place and understandings tend to be 
reduced to writing. 
Given the practical realities of eleventh-century trade, it is unlikely that 
that the pubic legal system standing alone could have adequately supported 
long-distance trade without either network governance or some other form 
of private ordering to complement it. For third-party enforcement to be an 
effective means of enforcing contractual obligations, the obligations 
themselves must condition on information that is verifiable—that is, 
information that can be found by a court with sufficient accuracy at a price 
transactors would consider reasonable from an ex ante perspective. Yet the 
core obligations in the legally unenforceable suhba were too amorphous to 
be verifiable and, even when disputes related to written partnerships, the 
information that would be relevant to a court in deciding a commercial 
dispute would likely have been unverifiable,242 making courts a largely 
(although not entirely) ineffective institution for supporting trade. 
B. Insufficient Reputation-Relevant Information Circulating in the Market 
Historians have pointed out that if reputation-based sanctions were 
important to the support of the Maghribi trade, the Geniza letters should be 
replete with tales of malfeasance243 and discussions of reputation, integrity, 
 
GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 154. The availability of commission agency 
“was well known among the Geniza merchants,” yet it was rarely used. Goldberg, Business Relationships, 
supra note 1, at 17. 
 241 The historians implicitly acknowledge that formalities can be useful even when obligations are 
largely or entirely unenforceable when they note that the suhba was a “serious undertaking: it was begun 
and ended formally, often through the taking of oaths—but there was no contract under law.” Goldberg, 
Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 19. Formality is, in fact, a hallmark of systems that rely on 
bilateral or multilateral reputational enforcement mechanisms. Most trade associations that have 
developed trading rules for use of their members have chosen to adopt very clear bright-line rules and 
have been careful to ensure that their application depends on facts that are not only observable, but also 
verifiable. See Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 225; Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 226. 
 242 Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 865–66 (“In the eleventh century . . . [t]he 
court was usually unable to verify agents’ claims and actions or to track down an agent who had 
emigrated.”). 
 243 Malfeasance was defined by a historian as the “failure to carry out the commercial actions that 
their ‘principals’ asked them to do, putting through deals using the capital entrusted to them by the 
‘principal’ but not sharing the profits . . . , failure to stay in communication, [and] to repay debts,” Email 
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and honesty; yet a content analysis of the letters reveals that “only a handful 
of documents [letters] reflect allegations about misconduct,”244 and 
discussions of probity were rare.245 The absence of these types of comments, 
however, does not undermine the idea that the information infrastructure of 
the Maghribi was robust enough to support multilateral reputation-based 
trade.246 
1. Malfeasance 
Even though the letters did not include extensive discussions of honesty 
or dishonesty, they routinely included the types of market information that 
would have permitted traders to infer malfeasance if and when it occurred. 
They included detailed information about market prices, the cargo and 
sailing and arrival times of ships, and the local political situation that would 
have made it possible for recipients to detect price-related misbehavior by 
their agents and assess the validity of the most common types of excuses 
proffered. “[I]nstructions and reports on . . . business dealings account for 
nearly half of the exposition of all letters . . . .”247 Of the space devoted to 
discussing business behavior, 41% focused on the actions of the writer, 13% 
on the actions of the recipient, and 46% on the behavior of third parties.248 
Common topics (and the percent of the text in the letters devoted to them) 
included transactions (48.5%), behavior of associates (18.0%), other 
information (11.9%), travels (5.2%) and legal actions (1.4%).249 Merchants 
typically had more than one agent in each market. This enabled them to 
triangulate much of the information they received.250 This information should 
have, and seems to have, permitted traders to make inferences about their 
 
from Sheilagh Ogilvie, Prof. of Econ. History, Univ. of Cambridge, to author (Dec. 16, 2016) (on file 
with Northwestern University Law Review), and by another as behavior ranging from “shirking work to 
misreporting trades to embezzling goods,” as well as taking advantage of information asymmetries, 
Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 23. 
 244 Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 864. 
 245 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 149. 
 246 Greif views the absence of frequent discussions of malfeasance and the infrequency of 
exclusionary punishment as consistent with the traders’ coalition hypothesis since in the coalition model 
malfeasance and with it “[p]unishment is off-the-equilibrium path,” and therefore discussions of it “are 
not likely to appear in the historical documents.” See Greif, Enforcement, supra note 237. 
 247 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 77. 
 248 Id. at 79 fig.3.6. 
 249 Id. at 78 fig.3.5. 
 250 See Stillman, Merchant House, supra note 28, at 41–42 (providing an example of Awkal getting 
conflicting information from his agents about the price of pepper and lacquer in an overseas location). 
Traders often asked one another for information on prices in particular markets. See, e.g., SIMONSOHN, 
supra note 15, at Letter #69 (where a Taherti asks Nahray for such information); Letter #65 (where an 
agent provides Nahray with some information he requested). 
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partners’ and agents’ actions that would have enabled them to detect 
misbehavior even from afar. 
For example, suppose that an agent in Palermo sold a bale of flax on 
behalf of a Fustat merchant at one price, but reported receiving a much lower 
price in a letter. How, if at all, would one expect this type of malfeasance to 
be detected and in what form would one expect information about it to be 
disseminated across the relevant market? 
In the ordinary course of things, the Fustat merchant would get a letter 
from his agent reporting the sale price and perhaps arranging to remit 
payment. The Fustat merchant would also receive letters from his other 
agents in Palermo reporting on market prices.251 He might also acquire such 
information by talking to fellow Fustat merchants who either traveled to or 
did business in Palermo. If the Fustat merchant concluded from the 
comparison that his agent cheated—and decided to make that known to the 
relevant market participants—he would have two options. First he could talk 
about it within the Fustat market, which was very close-knit. This would 
spread information harmful to the agent’s reputation and make those in 
Fustat less likely to deal with him in the future. Second, he could send letters 
to those in the agent’s home market or other markets alerting them to the 
agent’s misbehavior.252 Whichever route he chose, it would be unlikely to be 
reflected in the Geniza documents, since very few of the letters from Fustat 
found their way into the Geniza.253 
In sum, although the Maghribi letters sent to Fustat might not have 
discussed malfeasance very often, they routinely included information that 
would have enabled their recipients to infer malfeasance. Information about 
malfeasance could then have been spread orally or in letters, making a 
reputation-based sanctioning system an effective way to support trade. 
 
 251 Greif, Reputations and Coalitions, supra note 1, at 877 (noting that the Maghribi used a per 
transaction accounting system to make it easier for “merchants to compare their agents’ reports with any 
relevant information they have obtained from other sources”). 
 252 However, given that very few letters that were sent from Fustat were preserved, whether or not 
this took place cannot be established. 
 253 Similarly, if an agent in Palermo remitted the wrong percentage of profit to a partner in Fustat, 
only someone with knowledge of both the profit arrangement in the partnership agreement and the amount 
actually remitted would know whether the remittance was proper. Thus, a merchant in Fustat might get 
information about the relevant market prices or the amount actually received by his agent from another 
agent or friend in Palermo, but there would not likely be anyone in Palermo who would know that the 
actions of the agent were malfeasance. So, in thinking about the extent to which the network could 
transmit the type of information needed to make network governance effective, the focus should be on 
whether the breached-against party had a way to get the information he needed to determine whether there 
had been breach or performance, and how (letter or word of mouth) and to whom he might have 
transmitted this information once he had it. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 176–180, given 
the directionality of the letters in the Geniza, it is impossible to determine how often this was done. 
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2. Infrequent Mentions of “Ird” 
The historians who are skeptical that “reputation mechanism[s] 
were . . . [used to] signal[] and monitor[] honesty” suggest that if these 
mechanisms were operational, “merchants [would be expected] to refer 
incessantly to their integrity and honour,”254 a type of reputation known as 
“ird.” Ird was an aggregate assessment of a transactor’s reputation for 
probity.255 Yet the letters contain little explicit discussion of ird and a mere 
“tiny trickle of talk about honesty,”256 most of which was indirect.257 
But the infrequent mentions of ird do not necessarily suggest that 
reputation was unimportant. First, anything a writer said about his own ird 
would likely have been dismissed as self-interested puffery. Second, 
comments about someone else’s ird would likely have been seen as less 
accurate (due to echo effects258) and hence less valuable than recounting 
things that a person did or failed to do.259 Third, the letters contained a great 
deal of information about reputation in the jah sense of the word. In a world 
of network governance, information about who would, on a go-forward 
basis, be more constrained by fear of prospective reputation harm as a 
consequence of their network position (jah), might be viewed as more 
valuable than discussions of ird. The letters routinely included information 
that could be understood as merchants signaling the strength of their local 
jah. Merchants would typically ask the recipients of their letters to pass on 
their greetings to other traders in their recipient-agent’s locale. By naming 
their local connections, merchants were letting their agents know that they 
 
 254 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 32. 
 255 See id. at 32 (noting that ird was referred to in less than “half a per cent of the letters”). But see 5 
GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 203 (“Honor in the sense of a reputation acquired through integrity, 
reliability, and honesty was the most precious capital of a merchant . . . . Consequently, complaints about 
honor impugned are rather common in the Geniza business correspondence.”). 
 256 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 32. 
 257 Historians also point out that ird is rarely mentioned even in letters where one merchant is 
recommending another to a prospective business partner. Id. at 33–34. Yet such omissions are entirely 
understandable. A merchant would not recommend a dishonest associate (that is, one with a bad ird) so 
one would not expect much discussion of ird in the letters. In contrast, associates would likely have varied 
widely in their jah so discussing this would have been highly relevant. 
 258 Information about a trader’s ird might also have been viewed as less valuable because these types 
of highly subjective aggregate judgments are very vulnerable to distortion from the echo effects that, 
under certain conditions, tend to move aggregate judgments about reputation to the poles of extreme trust 
or distrust. As network theorists have explained, “[i]nformation obtained in casual conversations . . . 
creates an erroneous sense of certainty. Interpersonal evaluations are amplified to positive and negative 
extremes. Favorable opinion is amplified into trust. Doubt is amplified into distrust.” BURT, supra note 
32, at 168. 
 259 Similar preferences are revealed in modern procurement markets, where managers prefer to share 
information about specific things their contracting partners did or did not do, e.g., “he met only 80% of 
KPIs or his ppm error rate was 200,000,” rather than their impressions of their trustworthiness. See 
Interview With Supply Chain Manager and Engineer at Caterpillar, (Nov. 21, 2017). 
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had a lot of jah in the agent’s location, and, by implication, that the agent’s 
actions would be closely monitored, and, perhaps, reported back to them.260 
Conversely, in reporting back to their principals, agents often sent regards 
from people their principal knew in the agent’s area, a subtle way of 
communicating the identity of those who could confirm important particulars 
of the actions the agent had taken on their behalf. Agents would also send 
regards to traders in the principal’s location to signal that the principal should 
also take the agent’s jah into account when their roles were reversed. 
3. Accuracy 
Historians have argued that because the Maghribi traders did not have 
“any neutral mechanism for assessing accusations of opportunism,”261 the 
information that traveled through the Maghribi networks would not have 
been accurate enough for a multilateral reputation mechanism to work.262 
 
 260 For an example of a smaller merchant asking one of their prominent overseas suhba partners to 
monitor one of their other agents, see SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letter #102 (asking Nahray to 
“[p]lease keep an eye on Qāsīm and see to it that the flax is of good quality”). 
 261 Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 428. 
 262 Id. at 428. More specifically, these historians argue that because other successful systems of 
private contractual ordering, such as those found in the diamond industry, see Bernstein, Diamonds, supra 
note 20, and the cotton trade, see Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 226, at 124–30, have “arbitration boards 
and tribunals that evaluate accusations of opportunism before demanding sanctions from industry 
members not directly involved in a dispute,” Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 428, such tribunals are 
needed for reputation-based multilateral sanctions to effectively support trade. However, this argument 
is based on a faulty factual understanding of when these tribunals invoke multilateral reputation sanctions 
and fundamentally misunderstands the role that arbitration plays in supporting trade in these industries. 
 First, these tribunals only publicize wrongdoing when the wrongdoer fails to comply with an 
arbitration award. In the diamond industry, both the existence and outcomes of arbitrations are kept secret 
as long as the wrongdoer complies with the tribunal’s judgment. In the cotton industry, one tribunal 
follows the same practice, Bernstein, Cotton, supra note 226, at 1728–34 (describing the arbitral rules of 
the Memphis Cotton Exchange), while another produces written decisions describing the dispute and the 
outcome, but does not include the names of the parties, id. (describing the arbitral procedures at the Board 
of Appeals, the arbitration tribunal that decides disputes between merchants and mills). 
 Second, these tribunals decide only a small number of disputes per year relative to the number of 
transactions in the relevant markets. The dominant way they effect trade is not through “accurately” 
determining right and wrong, but by providing a back-stop or complement to, not a replacement for, 
network governance. Their main effect on the work-a-day circulation of reputation information is to make 
it more costly for a trader to make a false accusation of wrongdoing. Should he do so, the accused can 
point out that he was either (1) not taken to arbitration; or (2) if he was, he promptly complied with any 
judgment against him, because if he had not complied he would have been expelled from the Trade 
Associations or commodities exchanges that operated the tribunals. In both of these industries, work-a-
day commercial order is maintained predominately through interpersonal network governance. As a 
cotton dealer explained, the main cotton trading street in Memphis “is worse than a bunch of old women”: 
it is “like a sewing circle” and “most breaches of a serious nature are known within a day.” Bernstein, 
Cotton, supra note 226, at 1752 (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, as a diamond industry 
observer noted, “the bourse grapevine is the best in the world. It has been going for years and moves with 
the efficiency of a satellite communications network . . . . [I]nformation . . . is passed out along . . . 
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Although outside of suits in the Jewish or Muslim courts there were no 
dispute resolution tribunals that could render binding and enforceable 
decisions, the Maghribi did have access to mediation. “In their own locality 
merchants were expected . . . to help adjudicate disputes, negotiate 
settlements, maintain the rules of the market, and uphold the reputation and 
functioning of their city’s market.”263 Merchants’ Representatives were also 
expected to act as “neutral arbiter[s]” when disputes arose.264 More formal 
commercial mediation—staffed by two local merchants and a scribe—was 
available under the auspices of the Jewish court system. Although these 
tribunals also rendered purely advisory opinions, disputants tended to 
comply with them. Given the status of the merchants who served on these 
panels, failure to act in accordance with their recommendations would have 
likely been very damaging to a disputant’s reputation. 
Moreover, several features of the Maghribi trade contributed to the 
accuracy of the information circulating through the network. First, 
Merchants’ Representatives observed a great deal of commercial behavior 
directly and could aggregate it largely free of echo effects. They also had had 
a direct financial incentive to ensure that accurate reputation information 
circulated, and could easily have been consulted by merchants to check the 
gossip of the marketplace.265 Second, the use of witnesses (and the naming 
of witnesses one’s counterparty knew in agent letters), notaries, and contract 
registries—together with the propensity to conduct business in public—
likely contributed to the accuracy of circulating information and discouraged 
the transmission of inaccurate information for fear of detection. And, third, 
because it was widely known that merchants “operated through several 
agents at the same time and even at the same trade center,”266 agents would 
have been loath to transmit false information in a letter knowing there was a 
high probability that any misrepresentations would be detected. 
Finally, it is important to note that studies of reputation-based network 
governance in other contexts have shown267 that it can be an effective form 
of contract governance, even in the absence of “any neutral mechanism for 
assessing accusations of opportunism,”268 and even when the information 
 
tentacles that stretch around the world.” Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 20, at 121 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 263 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 140. 
 264 1 GOITEIN, SOCIETY, supra note 41, at 187. 
 265 See supra text accompanying notes 148–151. 
 266 Greif, Early Trade, supra note 1, at 528. 
 267 See, e.g., Robinson & Stuart, supra note 155; Macmillian & Woodruff, supra note 195, at 1285 
(documenting the effect of even very small networks on contract governance in Vietnam at a time when 
neither courts nor private dispute resolution systems provided formal support for trade). 
 268 Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 428. 
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transmitted though the network is somewhat subjective and is based on 
predicate facts that are observable to the person transmitting the information 
but are either partially or entirely unobservable and unverifiable by the 
recipient of the information.269 
C. Exchange with Muslim Traders 
Historians have noted that while the Maghribi traders preferred to deal 
with one another, they also traded with non-Maghribis (both Muslims and 
Jews) and routinely engaged non-Maghribi shippers and other helpers to 
perform various functions, “such as carrying money, accompanying goods, 
and carrying letters.”270 These historians maintain that relationships 
“between Maghribi and Muslim traders” were able to function “precisely 
because contracts could be enforced using legal institutions.”271 They further 
suggest that given the Maghribis’ use of the legal system in these 
relationships, it stands to reason that the Maghribi “used legal mechanisms 
 
 269 See, e.g., Robinson & Stuart, supra note 155, at 247, 270 (exploring a context in which the 
network was found to have exerted a considerable governance force even though much of the information 
the firms might have shared about the reasons for the success or failure of various alliances would have 
been based on information that was observable to the transactors but neither observable nor verifiable to 
the person with whom they were sharing the information). Moreover, even if the reputation-related 
information circulating through a network is not entirely accurate, as long as it is considered reliable 
enough to prompt further investigation before entering into a transaction with a particular trader, it can 
have a strong effect on contract governance. See Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 157, 
at 603 n.137 (“Network members do not need to completely trust network-circulated information for it to 
affect their actions. Sometimes information that is not viewed as entirely trustworthy might put the 
recipient firm on notice that further inquiry is needed before dealing with the firm in question. This 
in turn will raise the cost of dealing with the gossiped-about firm and make it a less attractive contracting 
partner at the early screening stage.”). The letters reveal that the Maghribi were wary of automatically 
accepting rumors as fact; merchants often attempted to verify and/or disprove rumors they heard and 
information they received. See Udovitch, Formalism, supra note 201, at 61, 76 (discussing a transaction 
in which a merchant entered into a suhba with an agent recommended by another business associate, but 
asked him numerous questions to test his knowledge and made him swear an oath—a serious request at 
that time—that all he said was true before agreeing to deal with him). It was not uncommon for merchants 
to solicit witnesses to prove that they took certain actions or dealt appropriately with changing market 
conditions, supra note 160, or for merchants to try to rehabilitate either their own reputations or the 
reputations of traders whose reputations they felt had been unfairly tarnished. These efforts likely reduced 
the likelihood that false rumors would lead to long-term reputational harm. 
 270 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 149 (“Geniza merchants [also] 
trusted . . . Muslim merchants and occasionally ship-captains or sailors[] not to cheat them in tasks such 
as carrying money, accompanying goods, and carrying letters—the very activities in which absconding 
might seem easiest.”); see also Stillman, Dissertation, supra note 15, at 75 (discussing Ibn Awkal’s 
dealings with Muslim agents and shippers). Interestingly, there were certain shippers who often dealt with 
the Maghribi traders and their names appear often in the letters. One notable example is Ibn Daisur. See 
SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letters #35, #43, #48, #49,  #53 & #95. Another example is Iskander. See 
id. at Letters #43, #64, #66, #69, #119, #140, #143, #154, #159, #106, #109 & #87. 
 271 Edwards & Ogilvie, supra note 1, at 442. 
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to enforce agency agreements” and that “[t]heir long-distance trade was not 
conducted solely using private-order enforcement mechanisms.”272 
This reasoning, however, overlooks the ways that the existence of a 
semi-closed network among the Maghribi traders could have supported at 
least some types of agreements between Maghribi merchants and Muslim 
market participants. Consider a Muslim who provided shipping or agency 
services to a Fustat-based Maghribi trader. As long as the Muslim viewed 
the prospect of future business with Maghribi traders to be valuable, his 
behavior could have been effectively, if imperfectly, governed by the force 
of network governance.273 Given the role that Maghribi traders played in the 
commercial life of Fustat, any non-Maghribi dealing with Maghribi in or 
connected to Fustat would have been aware that if they cheated, absconded, 
or underperformed in any way and this were detected by a Maghribi, it would 
likely become widely known, thereby jeopardizing the non-Maghribis’ 
ability to do business with Maghribi merchants274 or other traders in Fustat.275 
Maintaining a good reputation in Fustat would have been important to 
Muslim traders because “a vast amount of evidence points to the economic 
centrality of Cairo–Fustat in this period.”276 In addition, given the overseas 
connections of Fustat traders, information learned in Fustat could easily be 
transmitted throughout the Maghribi network—particularly to Sicily and 
Tunisia. 
More generally, the ability of a sufficiently closed network to discipline 
the activities of traders outside the network is, in certain conditions, a 
powerful force, and a major, yet underappreciated, aspect of network 
 
 272 Id. Greif views his model as consistent with some trade between Maghribi and non-Maghribi. See 
Greif, Enforcement, supra note 237, at 25 n.38 (A “multilateral reputation mechanism does not . . . require 
‘that Maghribis formed business associations for long-distance trade only with other Maghribis.’ It 
requires only that the value of group membership is sufficiently high in equilibrium given the number of 
non-group agents.” (internal cross-references omitted)). 
 273 Sureties were sometimes used for additional security. See GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, at 
Letter #11 (asking the recipient to send my goods “[s]hould a caravan set out in which trustworthy 
Muslims, who have given you sureties, will travel . . .”). 
 274 This conclusion assumes the non-Maghribi could be adequately identified to other traders. This 
appears to be true at least as regards non-Maghribi shippers, who are mentioned by name in the letters to 
identify which ship is carrying particular goods. As no description is given beyond their name, it seems 
that their identities were widely known. See SIMONSOHN, supra note 15, at Letters #97, #98, & #100 
(referring to shippers by name, seemingly assuming that the letter’s recipient knew whom they were 
talking about). 
 275 Similarly, if a non-Maghribi shipper cheated a Maghribi located in one of the overseas trading 
centers, this would likely have become known within the center. The power of this information could 
persist over time, even as new traders came and went from the center, if it were retained as local 
knowledge by the stationary Merchants’ Representative. 
 276 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 201; see also Stillman, Merchant 
House, supra note 28, at 15 (noting that in the eleventh century, “Fustat-Cairo [was] the nerve center of 
economic and commercial activity”). 
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governance. It arises from the observation that the degree of closure among 
recipients of reputation-related information—rather than the degree of 
closure among those generating the initial information—determines the 
strength of the network’s constraint on behavior.277 
Yet what exactly constrained the actions of the Fustat merchants in their 
dealings with Muslim traders and service providers is a more complex 
question that cannot be fully answered on the basis of available evidence.278 
As regards transportation providers, it is important to note that Jews “were 
excluded from certain economic sectors, such as transportation,”279 and only 
Muslims ran the caravans that transported goods overland on the Sabbath.280 
Given that Muslim shippers provided services the Maghribi could not 
provide for themselves, a shipper’s threat to terminate services if a trader 
behaved badly might well have been sufficient to induce traders to behave 
well, particularly if information about trader behavior was circulated among 
either shippers generally or shippers servicing particular locations. 
Thus, under certain conditions, private order might well have supported 
trade between Maghribi and Muslim merchants, and the existence of these 
apparently successful trading and service relationships does not weaken the 
 
 277 See BURT, supra note 32, at 93–166 (discussing the concept of closure). The ways that closed 
networks and groups can constrain the actions of market participants outside of the group/network is well 
illustrated by the New York diamond market in the 1980s. See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 20, at 
152 (analyzing the operation of the diamond industry’s private legal system and its use of nonlegal 
sanctions that relied on information transmitted by both social networks and more formal institutions to 
support trade). Under the rules of the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, the industry-wide umbrella 
organization, any trader who failed to promptly comply with a judgment rendered against him by a 
bourse’s arbitration system would be expelled from all member bourses, and a picture of him, along with 
a statement that the trader both failed to meet his obligations and refused to comply with an arbitration 
award rendered against him, would be posted at the entrance of all member bourses. Members who were 
found trading with expelled members were not themselves expelled from trading centers; yet they 
typically found it more difficult to do business with other bourse members. Because bourse membership 
increases the value of a trader’s business, most traders who are not members of a bourse hope to become 
members in the future. Bernstein, Diamonds, supra note 20, at 152. Potential future members know that 
to qualify for membership they would be required to have operated a diamond business for two years, 
have a member-sponsor who will guarantee their debts for a period of years, and have their name vetted 
in front of the membership as a whole. Id. at 19 nn.5–6. As a consequence, a trader who has not yet been 
admitted to a bourse has a very strong incentive to keep his commitments when dealing with a bourse 
member. Moreover, even if the trader did not want to be admitted to the bourse, this effect would still 
arise so long as he wished to deal with bourse members in the future. 
 278 One possible constraint is that the shippers “served both as transporters and customers,” so a 
desire to retain their customer base might have played a role. Goitein, Crusades, supra note 69, at 58. 
 279 GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 357. 
 280 The Sabbath-observant Maghribi sometimes used non-Jewish shippers because they could not 
travel themselves in “the great caravans that were a key part of North African economic connectivity,” 
which operated on the Sabbath, so they “certainly consigned shipments to these caravans, . . . under the 
care of non-Jews.” GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 54. 
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claim that private order was most likely the dominant way of supporting 
exchange.281 
In closing, although it is unclear what role, if any, the legal system 
played in contract enforcement, there are two important ways that the public 
system may have meaningfully contributed to the support and operation of 
the Maghribi trade.282 First, the public legal system provided a passably well 
developed set of property rights.283 Although the extent to which they could 
be effectively enforced is unclear, they likely played some role in supporting 
trade. Second, the Muslim and Jewish legal systems provided standard-form 
definitions of widely used transactional forms (different types of agency and 
partnership) whose contours were widely understood. These understandings 
were far more likely than any hypothesized law merchant284 to have provided 
the focal points for extralegal understandings that enabled private order to 
flourish.285 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the contract governance properties of the 
small-world network form and used it to provide an account of how long-
distance trade among the Maghribi traders might have been supported 
largely, if not entirely, independent of the public legal system. Yet it has also 
sought to suggest that the theory of small-world network governance 
discussed here has implications that go far beyond understanding this 
particular group of traders.286 
The small-world market structure has been documented in a wide 
variety of transactional contexts—ranging from inter-firm alliances287 to 
movie actors288—perhaps because the conditions that give rise to it are so 
 
 281 Contractual relations between Maghribi traders and Muslim market participants, however, 
certainly could have been differentially governed by the shadow of the Islamic legal system. Given the 
strictures of Jewish religious law, Jews would have been less wary of going to gentile courts in disputes 
with gentiles than going to gentile or Jewish courts to resolve disputes with other Jews. 
 282 See generally ACKERMAN-LIEBERMAN, supra note 166. 
 283 Goldberg, Business Relationships, supra note 1, at 26. 
 284 See GREIF, PATH, supra note 3, at 70–71 (suggesting that the Maghribi followed the norms of the 
law merchant in their work-a-day commercial interactions). But see ACKERMAN-LIEBERMAN, supra note 
166. 
 285 See Donahue, supra note 229; Kadens, supra note 229. 
 286 A search of Westlaw and Lexis turned up only seventeen mentions of the small-world network 
form, none of them dealing with exchange. 
 287 See, e.g., Bart Verspagen & Geert Duysters, The Small Worlds of Strategic Technology Alliances, 
24 TECHNOVATION 563, 563 (2004) (finding that “networks of strategic technology alliances can indeed 
be characterized as small worlds . . . [in the] chemicals and food, and electricals” industries). 
 288 See Brian Uzzi, Luis AN Amaral & Felix Reed-Tsochas, Small-World Networks and Management 
Science Research: A Review, 4 EUROPEAN MGMT. REV. 77, 79 (2007) (providing an overview of studies 
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common and because, as demonstrated here, it has potentially powerful 
contract governance advantages, particularly when augmented by central 
information nodes, which in more modern contexts can be trade associations, 
credit rating agencies, clubs, or any of a number of kinds of verification 
intermediaries.289 It has also been shown to have a beneficial impact on both 
a firm’s and an industry’s ability to innovate, an increasingly important 
determinant of strategic advantage in the modern economy. 
The ubiquity of small-world networks in commerce and their ability to 
bond trade outside the shadow of the law suggests that in thinking about the 
force of reputation-based sanctions or assessing the likelihood that private 
ordering will be able to effectively support or enhance exchange in any 
particular context, the analysis must move beyond the conditions the legal 
literature associates with private ordering—namely, close-knit, 
geographically concentrated, densely connected cliques. The focus needs to 
shift to exploring the broader (and narrower) patterns of ties among 
participants in both particular markets and particular industries as a whole 
that can support exchange.290 While the conditions emphasized in the legal 
literature remain relevant for thinking about the costs of various ties291 and 
the likelihood that particular patterns of ties will emerge, moving away from 
 
from a variety of contexts where the small-world network form characterizes the relationships between 
market participants). 
 289 Small-world networks have also been associated with innovation in particular markets. See 
Melissa A. Schilling & Corey C. Phelps, Interfirm Collaboration Networks: The Impact of Large-Scale 
Network Structure on Firm Innovation, 53 MGMT. SCI. 1113, 1113 (2007) (hypothesizing that “firms 
embedded in alliance networks that exhibit both high clustering and high reach (short average path lengths 
to a wide range of firms) will have greater innovative output than firms in networks that do not exhibit 
these characteristics,” and finding “support for this proposition in a longitudinal study of the patent 
performance of 1,106 firms in 11 industry-level alliance networks”). It may be that once the transaction 
cost advantages, strategic innovation advantages, and informal contract enforcement advantages of small-
world networks are taken into account, the small-world network form may turn out to be highly 
advantageous for many types of business. 
 290 The question of whether private ordering among the Maghribi traders should be considered a 
study of a religiously homogeneous group is not as straightforward as it might appear at first. The 
Maghribi were fully integrated into their local Jewish community for all purposes other than trade. They 
forwent potentially profitable trading opportunities in countries with many Jewish, but no Maghribi 
traders. Moreover, the traders group included members of the mainstream Jewish communities that 
followed the teachings of the Jerusalem Yeshivas, as well as members of the Karaite sect, which had 
separate synagogues and a very different set of religious practices. See GOITEIN, LETTERS, supra note 15, 
at Letter #11 (letter from the Tahertis’ followers of the Jerusalem Yeshivas to the Tustaris, who were 
Karaites). Moreover, as historian Goldberg notes, “shared Jewishness was neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for forming business relationships. There was no all-inclusive Jewish merchant 
network in this period.” GOLDBERG, TRADE AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 10, at 355. 
 291 This is not to say that ethnic ties are not special; they are. For an extensive treatment of the role 
of ethnicity in trade, see JANET TAI LANDA, ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF CHINESE MERCHANTS IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: IDENTITY, ETHNIC COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: INTEGRATING THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES WITH EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (2016). 
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these traditional factors should help identify additional circumstances where 
private ordering can be effective and/or reputational sanctions are likely to 
meaningfully change transactors’ behavior, even in contexts where a public 
legal system functions well. 
Interestingly, some case studies in the legal literature that are associated 
with network governance in geographically concentrated, close-knit small 
groups (that is, dense cliques), turn out to be examples of small-world 
networks if one either zooms in and looks at the exchange patterns within 
the group or zooms out and looks at the pattern of trade across the market as 
a whole. For example, the ties among the members of the New York 
Diamond Dealers Club appear to be and are a densely connected clique. Yet 
traders report that there are subgroups of traders with whom they deal more 
frequently. These subgroups, which partially overlap with one another, are 
typically defined by friendship, attendance at the same synagogue, and/or 
similar understandings of good and bad commercial behavior. 
Conversely, if one zooms out, one sees that the Club is one of twenty 
bourses the world over that are members of the World Federation of 
Diamond Bourses. The World Federation is a conduit for information and 
inter-bourse rule enforcement. Its bylaws provide that any trader who is 
expelled from a member bourse for failure to comply with an arbitration 
award will have his name and picture sent to all member bourses and will be 
immediately banned from entering any of them. The bourses are also linked 
by prominent (and less prominent) international diamond traders who travel 
among them and both spread information and trade using their reciprocal 
membership privileges.292 
 
 292 See Dixit, supra note 189, at 143–44 (noting that Bernstein’s description of the diamond industry 
institutions is an example of a two-tier contract governance mechanism). In the early 1900s the cotton 
and grain industries were also organized as bridge and cluster networks. Both had regional associations 
and/or exchanges that were linked together by a national organization that transmitted information about 
those who were expelled from the local association to all other local associations. And, when lumbermen 
decided that they needed to form social relationships to improve their business relationships, which were 
quite contentious, they formed the secret fraternal society of lumbermen, the Concatenated Order of Hoo-
Hoo. The Hoo-Hoo was composed of local clubs (clusters) who were united under the umbrella of Hoo-
Hoo International. Each year regional clubs and then clubs across the country met at giant social events 
called Concatenations. These events provided the opportunity to form friendships not only among the 
traders but also among their families.The theory behind the Hoo-Hoo was that “lumbermen meeting on 
the grounds of good fellowship could receive intangible benefits that might eventually trickle down into 
all aspects of business.” Billy Tarpley, 1892-1992: A Century of Fraternalism: The History of the 
International Concatenated Order of Hoo-Hoo, LOG & TALLY, May 1992, at 9. Hoo-Hoo who were found 
to have engaged in “unlawful or disreputable business” practices were expelled, and could no longer put 
the black cat, the symbol of membership, on their businesses’ correspondence and advertising. See By 
Laws of the International Concatenated Order of Hoo-Hoo, Incorporated, art. 2, § 8(a) (2018), 
https://www.hoohoo.org/siteFiles/4/HHI%20By-Laws%20updated%20Oct.%2003%202018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FT8C-VLGY]. 
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More broadly, the analysis presented here suggests that paying attention 
to network structure as a governance force may also contribute to the design 
of reforms to better support trade. It suggests that the focus of reform efforts 
in developing countries need not be on the creation of fully developed public 
legal systems—something that may be difficult to accomplish in certain 
settings. Rather, in many contexts, paying close attention to the pattern of 
ties among transactors can pinpoint places where trade will benefit from the 
creation of physical trading centers, information intermediaries like credit 
rating agencies or information bureaus, or even simply social groups of 
various kinds—ranging from bowling leagues, to secret fraternal societies, 
to eating clubs. All of these institutions can meaningfully contribute to the 
success of exchange, so long as they create channels for the flow of 
reputation-relevant information. Conversely, attention to network structure 
can help policymakers avoid reforms that might have unintended negative 
effects by disturbing the ties underlying the social basis of trade.293 
In sum, exploring network structures other than dense cliques that can 
support exchange, together with recent work on micronetwork structure 
which shows how certain patterns of ties in particular transactors’ immediate 
vicinity can support trade as or more effectively than the overall patterns of 
ties in the market,294 suggests that network analysis has a great deal to 
contribute to the understanding of private order and may, one day, make it 
possible to devise ways to support an ever more complex array of obligations 
without meaningful reliance on the public legal system.295 By identifying the 
small-world network as one of these alternative governance structures, this 
Article lends additional support to the overarching conclusion of Greif’s 
seminal work, namely “that private-order institutions . . . can support 
sophisticated exchange . . . [and that those designing] market-promoting 
policies should take [this] into account particularly in countries lacking an 
effective court system.”296 
 
 
 293 Addressing the way this alternative account of contract governance among the Maghribi traders 
fits into Greif’s theories of economic development more broadly is beyond the scope of this Article. 
However, is important to note that just as coalitions (especially, though not exclusively, those based on a 
fixed identity, such as Jews who emigrated from Baghdad and their decedents) face some limits on how 
much they can expand, and may at some point become unable to adequately support trade, small-world 
networks, too, may cease to be able to support trade if one or more of their most important (in this case 
upper-tier) nodes is disrupted by exogenous events like failure to pass a business to a son or sudden death 
of a group of family members. 
 294 See, e.g., Jackson et al., Social Quilts, supra note 202. 
 295 For example, some firms have created networks to effectively tie their hands and create credible 
commitments not to behave in particular ways, commitments that they could not have made through 
contract. For examples, see Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 157. 
 296  Greif, A Reappraisal?, supra note 10, at 2. 
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